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ABSTRACT
How early does criminal liability attach along the continuum between planning
and committing a terrorist act? And in light of the answer to that question, have
we struck an appropriate balance between the benefits of prevention and the off-
setting costs in terms of a potentially-increased rate of false-positives and
foregone opportunities to gather additional intelligence and evidence? These
questions are pressing, particularly in light of statements from senior
government officials that the Justice Department will be “forward-leaning” in its
interpretation of its anticipatory-prosecution powers. My aim in this article is to
establish a shared understanding regarding the first question in order to
facilitate an intelligent debate regarding the second.
In some respects, this is well-trodden ground. I and others have written
previously of the government’s sweeping capacity under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B to
prosecute potential terrorists who can be linked in some fashion to a designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (“FTOs”). But it is becoming clear that the
utility of § 2339B is eroding in the face of several developments, most notably the
ongoing decentralization of what might be called the “global jihad movement.”
Simply put, it is becoming less common for a suspected terrorist to be vulnerable
to a § 2339B FTO-support prosecution. What, then, is the government’s capacity
for anticipatory prosecution when confronted with “unaffiliated” terrorism?
Setting aside the possibility of a “pretextual” charge based on some unrelated
offense by a suspect, the basic options are a conspiracy charge under a
terrorism-related provision such as 18 U.S.C. § 956(a) or a charge under 18
U.S.C. § 2339A, the lesser-known of the two material-support statutes. The
article identifies the earliest plausible point of intervention under both options,
and examines the extent to which indictments in post-9/11 prosecutions have
stayed within these boundaries. My most notable conclusion, perhaps, is that §
2339A can be and arguably has been used to create a capacious form of inchoate
liability in circumstances that otherwise would have to be charged under the
relatively-demanding standards of attempt.
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“Prevention is the goal of all goals when it comes to terrorism because we simply
cannot and will not wait for these particular crimes to occur before taking
action.”
- Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, August 16, 20061
There is a continuum that runs from contemplation to completion of a criminal act.
Precisely how early along that continuum does federal criminal liability attach in
circumstances involving potential acts of terrorism?
The significance of this question became apparent during the summer of 2006 in
the wake of a string of arrests in terrorism-related cases both at home and abroad. The
first set of arrests came in Toronto in early June, when approximately seventeen men
were taken into custody by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on charges that they had
acquired three tons of ammonium nitrate and were planning to bomb a variety of targets
in Ottawa.2 Eventually, two men from Georgia would also be arrested in connection with
this group.3 Meanwhile, in late June, FBI agents in Miami arrested the head of an
obscure religious sect known as the Seas of David, along with six followers, on charges
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1 Attorney Gen. Alberto Gonzales, Remarks to the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh, “Stopping
Terrorists Before They Strike: The Justice Department’s Power of Prevention” (Aug. 16, 2006), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_060816.html.
2 See The Toronto Terror Plot: The Plan to Behead the Prime Minister, THE ECONOMIST, June 10, 2006, at
3 (providing an overview of the arrests).
3 See Dan Eggan, Georgia Pair Charged in Plot to Strike Capitol, World Bank, WASH. POST, July 20, 2006,
at A12 (discussing arrests of Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee).
2that they were conspiring to carry out a bombing campaign, possibly to include the Sears
Tower in Chicago.4 Two weeks later, the press reported that officials in Lebanon and
elsewhere had arrested at least some participants in a plot to destroy the Holland Tunnel,
running under the Hudson River between New Jersey and New York City.5
In each of these cases, U.S. government officials have gone out of their way to
calm the public by emphasizing that the plots were disrupted at a preliminary stage.
Speaking of the Miami arrests, for example, FBI Deputy Director John Pistole observed
that the plot was “more aspirational than operational.” 6 But the early nature of
prosecutorial intervention in these and other terrorism-related cases has not been
welcomed in every quarter. The prospect that the government has adopted a policy of
prosecuting suspected terrorists at the earliest available opportunity has generated
criticism from both the civil liberties and national security perspectives, with the former
contending that we risk prosecuting dissenting thought uncoupled from culpable action
and the latter contending that such a policy would sacrifice the benefits of additional
intelligence- and evidence-gathering.
The wisdom of early-stage anticipatory prosecution is, ultimately, a question of
policy. But an intelligent policy debate cannot take place without a shared understanding
4
“Seas of David is not a Muslim organization. By all accounts, the group uses Muslim discourse and
symbols. Yet it also relies heavily on Jewish and Christian discourse and symbols,” and “appears to
subscribe to its own brand of radical pan-African identity and national worldview.” Chris Zambelis,
Florida African-American Group Inspired by al-Qaeda Ideology, 27 TERRORISM FOCUS: A WEEKLY
JOURNAL OF NEWS AND ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 3, 4 (2006). As Zambelis writes, the
Seas of David arrests “may point to a growing trend among other radical groups that have little or no
connection to al-Qaeda” but that nonetheless find inspirational value in al Qaeda’s success. Id.
5 See Nancy Soloman, Arrests Made in Alleged N.Y.C. Tunnel Plot, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED, July 7, 2006 (observing that suspects had not yet acquired resources or engaged in
surveillance but were about to do so, and quoting the deputy director of the FBI’s New York City field
office for the proposition that “[a]t that point, . . . it is entirely appropriate to take them down”), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5541999&ft=1&f=2.
6 Press Conference (June 23, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/23/AR2006062300942.html.
3of the scope of the government’s power to prosecute in anticipation of a terrorist attack.
Unfortunately, there is a gap in the literature regarding the precise scope of that power.
That gap is particularly wide, moreover, with respect to an important – and expanding –
category of cases: those in which the suspect is “unaffiliated” in the sense that he or she
cannot be linked to an organization that already has been formally designated as a
“Foreign Terrorist Organization” (“FTO”) by the Secretary of State.
This article aims to fill that gap, and thus improve the quality of the emerging
debate, with a close study of the substantive criminal laws that constitute the
government’s anticipatory prosecution power. I begin in Part I by documenting the
emergence of a preference for early prosecutorial intervention in terrorism investigations
within the United States. I then contextualize the discussion that follows with an
overview of the costs and benefits that might be associated with such a policy. On one
hand, maximizing early prosecutorial intervention might be seen as desirable in that it
reduces the risk that investigators will misjudge their ability to shift from surveillance to
arrest in time to prevent violent acts from occurring. On the other hand, there are both
security and civil liberty costs to that approach. From a security perspective, early
criminal prosecution also means early termination of covert efforts to gather intelligence
and evidence, entailing both lost opportunities and greater risks of acquittals. From a
civil liberties perspective, maximized early prosecution may be undesirable in that it is
likely to increase the rate of false positives (i.e., prosecutions of persons who would not
in fact have gone on to commit the anticipated violent act). Each of these considerations
must be kept in mind in evaluating the merits of how federal criminal law currently is
4calibrated with respect to early intervention, as well as in formulating recommendations
for recalibration.
Against this backdrop, Parts II through IV establish the parameters of the
government’s anticipatory prosecution power in the terrorism context, with special
reference to how it actually has been employed since 9/11 and how its constituent
elements relate to one another. Part II begins by acknowledging that the government has
broad power to intervene with prosecutions in cases involving suspects linked to FTOs, in
light of two closely-related statutory regimes prohibiting the provision of support or
services to them. That capacity is declining in significance, however, in the face of a
trend I describe as “unaffiliated” terrorism. Briefly stated, the ongoing decentralization
of what might be described as the “global jihad movement,” combined with the
increasing popularity of the “leaderless resistance” organizational model among a diverse
array of extremist movements, combine to decrease the likelihood that a given terrorism
suspect can be linked to an FTO.
Parts III and IV examine the charging options and actual practice of federal
prosecutors faced with this “unaffiliated” terrorism scenario. In the context of conspiracy
liability – the subject of Part III – the issue turns on the degree of specificity that a given
statute requires as to the objectives of the alleged agreement, and also on the closely-
related question of how the participants to an agreement are identified. Is it enough that a
group of individuals share a generalized desire to use violence against United States
government employees or citizens? Does it matter if the suspects are associated with the
global jihad movement? Must they come to some degree of agreement with respect to
5the particular type of offense they might attempt, or perhaps even the particular means to
be used or target to be struck?
Part III opens with a survey of how questions regarding the scope and specificity
of conspiratorial agreements have been resolved by federal courts in run-of-the-mill, non-
terrorism prosecutions. The resulting “general rules” indicate that liability ordinarily
attaches at the point when the agreement becomes specific as to the type of criminal
offense to be achieved, and that it is not necessary also to prove any agreement (let alone
knowledge on the part of any one defendant) as to any of the details of executing the
offense, such as method, target, or date. They also establish that individuals who have no
direct contact with or actual knowledge of one another may nonetheless be part of a
single conspiracy, so long as there is a sufficient showing of their understanding of the
scope of their common endeavor. With that reference point established, I then consider
whether the same standards apply to federal statutes specifically associated with terrorism
conspiracies. By and large they do, though the inquiry is complicated with respect to 18
U.S.C. § 956, a conspiracy provision that has proven to be of critical importance in post-
9/11 terrorism prosecutions. Part III concludes by reviewing the fact patterns in recent §
956 cases, and suggesting that prosecutors to some degree have pushed the envelope with
respect to the scope of conspiracy liability in circumstances involving the global jihad
movement.
Conspiracy liability does not, however, set the outer boundaries of the
government’s anticipatory prosecution power when dealing with unaffiliated potential
terrorists. In that context, prosecutors in recent years have come to rely frequently on 18
U.S.C. § 2339A. This statute criminalizes the provision of material support or resources
6to any recipient (not just designated FTOs), so long as the defendant knew or intended
that the aid would be used “in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of” any of
several dozen predicate crimes listed in the statute. Part IV explores the role of § 2339A
as a vehicle for anticipatory prosecution of potentially-dangerous persons who cannot be
linked to a designated FTO, inquiring whether it provides liability in circumstances that
are – or at least should be – beyond the scope of liability under inchoate crime concepts
such as conspiracy and attempt. A close study of the fact patterns in post-9/11 § 2339A
cases indicates that it does, and also that prosecutions taking place at these outer
boundaries tend to present an exacerbated version of the policy tensions inherent in
anticipatory prosecutions. Part V concludes.
I. The Early Intervention Dilemma
It has been clear for some time that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has made
the prevention of terrorist attacks a top strategic priority, and thus that it will intervene
before an attack occurs whenever it is possible to do so.7 What is less clear is whether
there is a policy – formal or otherwise – concerning the appropriate point of prosecutorial
intervention in the ex ante scenario. Should suspects be arrested and indictments
unsealed at the earliest possible opportunity? Should prosecutors instead be encouraged
to delay intervention as long as possible in order to maximize the collection of
intelligence and evidence? Should the issue of timing be left to the discretion of the
officials involved, to be resolved on an ad hoc basis?
It seems highly unlikely that there is any rigid policy purporting to determine, in
across-the-board fashion, the proper timing for prosecutorial intervention. Indeed, such
7 See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26-28 (2005) (describing emergence of the prevention-oriented
paradigm).
7an approach presumably would be resisted by other significant stakeholders in the
interagency process relating to terrorism policy, including among others the Director of
National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and perhaps even
the Secretary of Defense.8 Nevertheless, the events of the summer of 2006 suggest that
there is at least a presumption in favor of maximizing early intervention in terrorism
cases.
In an address to the American Enterprise Institute in May 2006 that foreshadowed
the series of arrests that would soon follow, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty
advocated an aggressive approach to anticipatory prosecution. 9 “On every level,”
McNulty said, “we [are] committed to a new strategy of prevention. The 9/11 attacks
shifted the law enforcement paradigm from one of predominantly reaction to one of
proactive prevention.”10 Under this paradigm, DOJ does not “wait for an attack or an
imminent threat of attack to investigate or prosecute,” but instead does “everything in its
power to identify risks to our Nation’s security at the earliest stage possible and to
respond with forward-leaning – preventative – prosecutions.”11 Citing several post-9/11
prosecutions in which the government had intervened at a relatively early stage, McNulty
elaborated that “[w]e could await further action by these men and then arrest and
8 Each of these officials, in their intelligence-gathering capacities, may prefer that prosecution be delayed
or foregone entirely in some circumstances.
9 Dep. Atty. Gen. Paul McNulty, Prepared Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute (May 24, 2006),
available at http://justice.gov/dag/speech/2006/dag_speech_060524.html.
10 Id. See also id. (“[I]n deciding whether to prosecute, we will not wait to see what can become of risks.
The death and destruction of September 11, 2001 mandate a transformed and preventative approach.”).
11 Id. McNulty acknowledged that the new posture might come at a cost in terms of prosecutorial success
rates. The “reality of our prevention strategy,” he explained, “is that we may find it more difficult in
certain cases to marshal the evidence sufficient to convince 12 jurors beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Such
acquittals were inevitable, he noted, “because we must bring charges before a conspiracy achieves its goals
– before a terrorist act occurs. To do so, we have to make arrests earlier than we would in other contexts
where we often have the luxury of time to gather more evidence.” Id. The development of further
evidence also might reduce rather than bolster concerns about a particular suspect, of course, meaning that
an increased reliance on anticipatory prosecutions may foster false positives as well as false negatives.
8prosecute them. Or we could prosecute at the moment our investigation reveals both a
risk to our national security and a violation of our Nation’s laws. In the wake of
September 11, this aggressive, proactive, and preventative course is the only acceptable
response . . . .”12
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff echoed this perspective in the
wake of the Holland Tunnel plot arrests later that summer. Though the arrests in that
case occurred overseas and were carried out by agents of other governments, Chertoff
took the opportunity to emphasize their consistency with our own preference for early
intervention and to explain why that approach is warranted:
[W]e always intervene at the earliest possible opportunity, just as we’ve done in a
series of operations we’ve undertaken over the last couple of months . . . . We
don't wait until someone has lit the fuse to step in and prevent something from
happening. That would be playing games with people's lives. . . . Last year's
attacks in London, 2004's attacks in Madrid and, of course, the attacks in 2001 are
all reminders of the fact that we cannot drop our guard. But at the same time,
people can rest assured that we move very swiftly, at the first sign of a plot, and
we do not wait until the last minute to intervene. . . . We swoop in as early as
possible. Because experience shows – and I think London is a great example –
that the distance between planning and actually operational activity is a very short
distance. And anybody who thinks they have time to wait and see how things play
out I think is really taking a foolish approach to the issue of security.”13
The most recent and significant statements on this subject have come from
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, in the wake of arrests in London in mid-August 2006
that apparently disrupted a plot to detonate liquid explosive on board a number of
12 Id. (referring to the prosecutions of “Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, Iyman Faris, and members of the Northern
Virginia Jihad”). See also id. (noting that in the prosecution of Soliman Biheiri, the DOJ had chosen to
prosecute for immigration fraud “rather than prolong the investigation . . . and thus leave open the risk to
our Nation’s security presented by all of the facts and circumstances we knew at the time about Biheiri”).
13 Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, Press Conference (July 7, 2006) (italics added)
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0607/07/lol.02.html.
9transatlantic flights.14 In a speech at the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh titled
“Stopping Terrorists Before They Strike: The Justice Department’s Power of
Prevention,” 15 the Attorney General noted that the key question for preventive
prosecution is “when to arrest and begin prosecution.”16 He observed that ordinarily “we
need to gather enough information and evidence during our investigations to ensure a
successful prosecution,” and that the choice of when to intervene ultimately “must be
made on a case-by-case basis by career professionals using their best judgment – keeping
in mind that we need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods and sometimes
rely upon foreign evidence in making a case.” 17 That said, however, the Attorney
General also declared that “we absolutely cannot wait too long, allowing a plot to
develop to its deadly fruition. Let me be clear, preventing the loss of life is our paramount
objective. Securing a successful prosecution is not worth the cost of one innocent life.”18
Of course, criminal prosecution is not the only mode of response available to
government officials once they have made the decision to intervene to incapacitate a
suspected terrorist. 19 But the two most significant alternatives – immigration
enforcement and military detention – may be of declining utility in the years to come.
Immigration enforcement by definition has no application with respect to citizens, and
14 See Joshua Partlow, Police Keeping Most Plot Suspects in Custody, Without Charges, Under Terror Law,
WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2006, at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/12/AR2006081200566.html
15 See supra note 1.
16 Id.
17 Id. See also id. (“Determining when to arrest would-be terrorists depends on countless factors like the
dangerousness of the possible attack, the parties involved, and the imminence of the plot becoming
operational.”).
18 Id.
19 It is important to note that covert surveillance and other forms of information gathering by intelligence
and criminal investigators is itself a significant mode of response, and that there is a sharp debate about the
merits of shifting from the covert information-gathering mode to any form of overt intervention. I do not
intend to express a view on that debate here, but instead to shed light on the scope of the government’s
options once the decision has been made to intervene overtly via criminal prosecution.
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recent trends indicate that the threat of terrorism often will emanate from “homegrown”
sources rather than aliens in the future.20 And while military detention has been used on
two occasions since 9/11 in circumstances involving suspected terrorists captured in the
U.S., 21 lingering uncertainty about the legality of that approach 22 combined with
extensive political pressure not to employ it tends to curb its availability going forward.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld – striking down the military
commission process established by the Administration as a mechanism for prosecuting
terrorists for war crimes – further undermines the attractiveness of the military model.23
Considering that when it comes to persons arrested in the U.S. the government already
relies primarily on criminal prosecution even with respect to al Qaeda suspects,24 these
20 For a discussion of the “home-grown” terrorism phenomenon, see Part II.C.2, infra. The Miami arrests
in the Seas of David case, as well as the Georgia arrests associated with the Toronto plot, provide
illustrations from the summer of 2006.
21 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-32 (2004) (describing military detention of U.S. citizen
arrested in the U.S.); Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F.Supp.2d 673, 674-75 (D.S.C. 2005) (describing military
detention of Qatari citizen arrested in the U.S.).
22 See Tung Yin, Dodging the Jose Padilla Case, 28 NAT. SEC. L. REP. 3 (2006) (describing the twists and
turns of litigation associated with the military detention of Jose Padilla, including the government’s
decision to transfer him to civilian custody for criminal prosecution at a time when a petition for certiorari
challenging the legality of his military detention was pending in the Supreme Court), available at
http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/nslr/NSLR_july2006.pdf. See also Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th
Cir. 2005) (holding that the September 18, 2001, Authorization for Use of Military Force empowered
President to detain at least those persons who bore arms against the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan, even
if not captured until they arrived in the U.S.). In contrast, it remains clear that military detention is lawful
with respect to persons captured in the course of armed conflict in more traditional battlefield contexts. See
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-21 (2004) (affirming legality of using military detention in
connection with persons captured in connection with hostilities in Afghanistan).
23 See 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). Another limiting factor comes into play where a suspect is in the hands of a
state which will not transfer the individual without assurances that the U.S. will eschew military detention.
See, e.g., Rob Gifford, Bankers’ Extradition to U.S. Angers British Business, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
MORNING EDITION, July 12, 2006 (describing efforts by suspected terrorism supporters Babar Ahmed and
Haroon Rashid Aswat to resist extradition from the U.K. to the U.S. on the ground that the U.K. should not
trust U.S. assurances that the men will receive civilian criminal trials rather than be held as enemy
combatants), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5551003.
24 Notwithstanding the adoption and extensive reliance on military detention as a tool of prevention since
9/11 – and notwithstanding occasional rhetoric critical of reliance on criminal law enforcement in the
terrorism context – the Bush Administration has continued to rely heavily on domestic criminal prosecution
in cases involving both domestic and foreign terrorist threats, including threats directly linked to al Qaeda.
High-profile examples include the prosecutions of Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid. See United
States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004) (addressing witness issues raised by the Moussaoui
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developments suggest that DOJ will bear an increasing share of the burden when the
decision is made to incapacitate a suspected terrorist within the United States in the future.
This, in turn, will sustain or even enhance the pressure on DOJ to push the envelope with
respect to its capacity for early intervention in such cases.
Assuming that there is at least a preference within DOJ for “forward-leaning –
preventative – prosecutions,”25 difficult policy questions arise. On one hand, seeking to
maximize early intervention in terrorism cases entails plausible and significant benefits.
The sooner that one moves to incapacitate a potential terrorist, the less risk one runs that
the person will slip surveillance or otherwise get into position to commit a harmful act
before officials can intervene.26 Even if the risk enhancement associated with delay is
relatively small, the magnitude of the harm to be averted in the terrorism context – from
the perspective of both the individuals who may be subjected to violent acts and the
larger society – may be such that any appreciable risk enhancement should be avoided if
at all possible.
On the other hand, there are a variety of offsetting costs associated with a policy
of maximizing early-stage prosecution. From the national security perspective, these
costs are at least three-fold. First, and most significantly, overt intervention in the form
of a prosecution presumably will end any covert intelligence-gathering program that may
have been in place with respect to the defendant; opportunities to monitor frank
communications, to identify confederates, and to learn a variety of other critical facts will
prosecution); United States v. Reid, 211 F. Supp.2d 366 (D. Mass. 2002) (denying motion to suppress
evidence in “shoe bomber” prosecution). See also Appendix B.
25 McNulty, supra note 9. 
26 For an excellent discussion of these risks, see Wayne McCormack, Inchoate Terrorism: Liberalism
Clashes with Fundamentalism, 37 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. 1, 13-16 (2005) (citing United States v.
Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988), which “demonstrates the dilemma of conspiracy investigators, as
even with the wiretap the plotters succeeded in getting dynamite on board a U.S. commercial airliner”).
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come to an end at that point. Indeed, for this reason some have argued that security goals
frequently will be better served by delaying prosecution as long as possible.27 The
second point is closely related: ongoing observation does not merely serve to collect
intelligence, but may also yield additional evidence that will enhance the prospects for
success at trial. A delayed prosecution in this sense may be a more viable prosecution,
perhaps significantly so. The third and final point follows from the second: to the extent
that an early-stage prosecution is perceived as unjustified, it may have a negative impact
on the willingness of members of a critical community – such as Arab- or Muslim-
Americans – to actively cooperate with intelligence and criminal investigators.28
Early-stage prosecution also entails significant civil liberty concerns. This point
is well-illustrated by Philip K. Dick’s short story (and motion picture) The Minority
Report, which envisioned a future in which government officials believe that they have
developed the ultimate form of preventive criminal law enforcement. By relying on the
visions of a trio of seemingly unerring psychics, police are able to consistently detect
crime before it occurs, sometimes even before the perpetrator begins to contemplate the
course of conduct that would lead to the offense. “Precrime,” as it is called, appears to be
the realization of a law enforcement fantasy: all criminal harms are averted,29 without any
false positives in the form of persons wrongly accused. Or so it seems at first. Suffice to
say that events soon call into question the accuracy of the predictions, suggesting in
27 See RICHARD POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN THE THROES OF REFORM
96 (2006) (making this point); MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 180-81 (2004)
(describing the arrest of terrorism suspects in one instance as a “mishandled opportunity” to try and turn the
suspects into intelligence assets).
28 Cf. PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 78, 100-01
(2003) (emphasizing the need for community cooperation in intelligence-gathering).
29 At least as to violent crimes, that is. It is unclear whether the psychics were similarly attuned to con
artists, insider traders, jaywalkers, and so forth. The plot certainly suggests, however, that they were asleep
at the switch with respect to public corruption.
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dramatic fashion that there is no avoiding the cost-benefit tradeoff between crime
prevention measures and the risks of false positives.
To a certain extent, of course, the problem of false positives cannot be avoided. It
is a risk that is inherent in the task of criminal prosecution, whether prevention-oriented
or not. But the degree of risk is not uniform across all types of criminal liability. The
farther that one moves from the paradigm of a completed act – as one moves backwards
successively through attempt, to advanced planning, to initial planning, and so forth – the
more tenuous the link between the defendant and the anticipated harm becomes and,
hence, the more likely it is that false positives will be generated.
Concerns under this heading appear to have sparked the recent surge in interest in
the government’s capacity for anticipatory prosecution. Writing in the Washington Post,
Dahlia Lithwick argued that federal prosecutors are running too great a risk of false
positives in their efforts to intervene at the aspirational-but-not-operational stage. 30
Invoking the imagery of The Minority Report, Lithwick contends that early-stage
intervention as practiced in the Miami Seas of David arrests approaches the
criminalization of mere thoughts, and strikes the wrong balance between the benefits of
preventive action and the risks that defendants will be prosecuted for acts that they might
never actually have committed.31
30 See Dahlia Lithwick, Stop Me Before I Think Again, WASH. POST, July 16, 2006, at B3, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/14/AR2006071401383.html.
31 See id. Less dramatically, but with more substance, National Public Radio’s Talk of the Nation recently
devoted a segment to the “ongoing debate over preemptive arrests,” asking whether a crime had yet been
committed in these scenarios. See Making the Arrest Before the Crime, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO TALK OF
THE NATION, July 12, 2006, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5552058.
The issue also is percolating in the U.K., with a particular emphasis on the false-positives concern. See, e.g,
Jennifer Quinn, Focus in Britain Falls on Prosecution, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2006 (discussing such
concerns in the wake of the liquid-explosives plot arrests), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/12/AR2006081200840.html.
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In short, there is an inherent tension between the costs and benefits associated
with preventive interventions in general, a tension that grows sharper the earlier that the
intervention occurs. Whether it is wise in light of this tension to maximize early
intervention is, for the most part, a question of policy rather than of law. But just as one
cannot properly assess the legal status quo without an appreciation for these policy
consequences, an intelligent policy debate cannot take place without a shared
understanding of just how early it is that current criminal laws permit prosecutors to
intervene. I turn to that question in the pages that follow.
II. The Declining Utility of FTO-Support Prosecutions
In prior work, I have described in detail the capacity of the federal government to
prosecute individuals under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B for providing “material support or
resources” to foreign entities that have been formally designated as FTOs by the
Secretary of State and under 50 U.S.C. § 1705 for providing services to foreign entities
and individuals that have been subjected to a similar terrorism-related designations
pursuant to Executive Order. 32 I will not repeat that analysis here, other than to
summarize the manner in which these statutes provide the government with a robust
capacity for anticipatory prosecution.
Briefly stated, § 2339B and §1705 were designed to achieve prevention indirectly
by reducing the flow of resources to FTOs,33 but also are capable of serving the goal of
prevention more directly in that they provide a readily-available charge in circumstances
32 See Chesney, Sleeper Scenario, supra note 7; Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism-
Prevention Paradigm: The Guilty by Association Critique, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1408 (2003) (book review).
33 See Chesney, Sleeper Scenario, supra note 7, at 4-18 (describing the origins of the terrorism-support
laws).
15
involving potentially-dangerous persons whom the government wishes to incapacitate.34
The statutes define the forbidden forms of support quite broadly, sufficiently so to
encompass most forms of interaction that might take place between a suspected terrorist
and an FTO.35 Indeed, “material support or resources” is defined to include not only the
provision of various forms of equipment and services, but also the act of providing one’s
own self as “personnel” to the designated group.36 In most circumstances in which a
suspected terrorist in linked to an FTO, therefore, the conduct that constitutes that very
linkage most likely constitutes a violation of the support statutes. This gives the
government a ground to intervene that is independent of whether prosecutors can prove
that the suspect is actually planning to carry out a terrorist attack.37
There is, however, a significant limit on the reach of prosecutions under § 2339B
and § 1705. By definition, these statutes have no application unless a designated entity
(hereinafter simply “FTO”) is involved. The threat of terrorist violence, however, is not
always attributable to an FTO.
“Unaffiliated” terrorism – i.e., acts of political violence carried out by an actor not
affiliated with a formally designated FTO – can arise in many ways. Terrorism can be
used by groups that previously were unknown or in any event have not yet been
designated formally by the U.S. government. It can emanate from individuals – lone
wolves – who do not appear to have any particular organizational ties, designated or
otherwise. And as highlighted in connection with the Seas of David arrests in Miami,
34 See id. at 39-46 (discussing the use of § 2339B to prosecute potential terrorists rather than “mere”
supporters of terrorist groups).
35 The definition is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1), and incorporated by reference in 18 U.S.C. §
2339B(g)(4).
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).
37 See Chesney, Sleeper Scenario, supra note 7, at 39-46.
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terrorism can emanate from domestic as well as foreign sources. Unfortunately, it
appears that the category of unaffiliated terrorism is growing.
A. The Growth of Unaffiliated Terrorism
There was a time when terrorism was thought to be of strategic significance only
insofar as it was employed as a deniable method of asymmetric warfare by a sovereign
state, acting either through agents of their own clandestine services or through private
groups subject to their direction or control. 38 Over time, that view changed to
accommodate the existence and significance of terrorist organizations that operated
relatively or even entirely independently of state control, a model that arguably reached
its apex in the form of al Qaeda as it existed at the time of the 9/11 attacks.39 Since 9/11,
however, the nature of the terrorist threat has continued to diversify.
Vice Admiral John Scott Redd, the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center (“NCTC”), recently spoke of this development in testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in June 2006.40 Admiral Redd explained that there are
“three distinct incarnations of the terrorist threat” today.41 First, “al-Qa’ida and its core
senior leadership” continue to be the government’s “preeminent concern.”42 Second, a
“host of other Sunni terrorist groups around the globe . . . have been inspired by al-Qa’ida
and . . . subscribe to the violent extremist worldview articulated by the al-Qa’ida senior
38 See generally TIMOTHY NAFTALI, BLIND SPOT: THE SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICAN
COUNTERTERRORISM (2005) (describing the origins and evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policy). See
also DAVID C. WILLS, THE FIRST WAR ON TERRORISM: COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY DURING THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION (2003) (analyzing the counterterrorism policy decision-making process); NEIL C.
LIVINGSTONE, THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 12 (1982) (contending that most “major” terrorist groups at
that time were subject to the influence of the USSR).
39 See NAFTALI, supra note 38.
40 Prepared testimony of Vice Admiral John Scott Redd, Director, National Counterterrorism Center,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 13, 2006), available at
http://www.nctc.gov/press_room/speeches/20060613.html.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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leadership.”43 “Many members of these groups,” Redd observed, “view themselves as
part of a global violent extremist network that aims to advance the al-Qa’ida agenda and
target U.S. interests around the world.”44
These first two categories – al Qaeda itself, and other militant Sunni
fundamentalist groups willing to employ violence for political ends – in theory are
amenable to an anticipatory-prosecution strategy that depends on identification of links
between terrorism suspects and formally-designated FTOs. But Admiral Redd went on to
identify a third category that has begun to emerge recently, one that is not so amenable:
“Our third area of concern with respect to the terrorist threat is the relatively
recent emergence of a ‘homegrown’ variant of the traditional terrorist cell or
group. Following on the attacks last summer in England, the recent arrests in
Canada highlight the growing salience of this trend. We are uncovering the
spread of new violent extremist networks and cells that lack formal ties or
affiliation with al-Qa’ida or other recognized terrorist groups. These groups or
cells do not fall under the command and control of the AQ senior leadership and
indeed operate quite independently.”45
Unaffiliated terrorism of this variety is not an entirely new phenomenon, of
course. Any circumstance in which terrorist methods are employed by individuals or
small cells who share ideological inspirations but not formal organizational ties arguably
can be characterized in this way. By that definition, examples in the modern era trace
back at least to the anarchist violence of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.46 In more
recent years, the concept of “leaderless resistance” – popularized in the early 1990s by an
Aryan Nations supporter named Louis Beam47 – has led to the conscious cultivation of
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. (emphasis added).
46 See WALTER LAQUEUR, A HISTORY OF TERRORISM 14 (2002) (discussing the anarchist “propaganda of
the deed”).
47 See JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD 150-51 & n. 8-9 (2002) (citing Louis Beam,
Leaderless Resistance, SEDITIONIST 12, February 1992).
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the unaffiliated model for the violent fringes of movements focused on issues ranging
from the environment48 to abortion.49
Technological developments are contributing to the growth of the unaffiliated
model. In the past, the limited nature of communication technologies imposed significant
limits on the threat that could be posed by truly decentralized or leaderless movements.
First, it was difficult for such movements to spread their ideology given their lack of
access to mass media (a problem which contributed to their desire to resort to terrorism as
a form of propaganda). Second, even for those who already were duly inspired, it was
difficult to identify like-minded individuals with whom to cooperate in carrying out an
attack, and equally difficult to acquire knowledge of techniques and methods that might
be necessary to succeed in an attack. Unfortunately, the emergence of internet
communications, coupled with encryption technology, has significantly reduced these
natural barriers.50 Ideology can be spread and inflamed on a global scale with relative
ease through the online posting of various media.51 Contacts are made in chat rooms and
email exchanges, opening the door to in-person cooperation at a later stage.52 Advice and
48 See, e.g., Peter Chalk, U.S. Environmental Groups and ‘Leaderless Resistance, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE
REVIEW, July 1, 2001 (describing the Environmental Liberation Front as a “movement [that] exists more as
a networked entity than as a concrete group with a clearly identified leader and member roll”), available at
http://www.rand.org/commentary/070101JIR.html.
49 See, e.g., STERN, supra note 47, at 150-51 & accompanying notes (discussing embrace of the leaderless
resistance model by the “Army of God,” a “shadowy organization that advocates killing abortion providers
as ‘justifiable homicide’”).
50 These developments also create new opportunities for surveillance and infiltration of decentralized
networks. See Nadya Labi, Jihad 2.0, THE ATL. MONTHLY, July/August 2006, at 102; Benjamin Wallace-
Wells, Private Jihad: How Rita Katz Got Into the Spying Business, THE NEW YORKER, May 29, 2006, at 28.
51 See Labi, supra note 50.
52 See id.
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expertise on technical issues ranging from online security to the construction of
improvised explosive devices is just a click away.53
The emergence of this appealing information environment for the formation of
decentralized networks and leaderless resistance coincides, moreover, with two other
significant developments: the rapid expansion of an ideo-theological movement extolling
the use of violent force as a vehicle for spreading a particular conception of Islam,54 and
worldwide efforts to suppress that movement making it difficult for supporters to
organize along traditional, hierarchical lines.55 The movement itself is closely linked to
and often conflated with al Qaeda, but the two are not coextensive, as a brief review of
the relevant history indicates.
B. The Origins and Evolution of the Global Jihad Movement
Al Qaeda is not coextensive with the global jihad movement, thought it certainly
plays a critical role within it. Rather, it is best to conceive of al Qaeda as the would-be
vanguard of the movement, seeking both to define and propagate its tenets and goals and
to radicalize and organize the many factions, organizations, and individuals that adhere to
its perspective.56 The global jihad movement itself, in contrast, might fairly be described
as the violent operational fringe of a highly-controversial interpretation of Islam rooted in,
but distinct from, the Wahhabi and Salafist movements.
53 See, e.g., H. Brian Holland, Inherently Dangerous: The Potential for an Internet-Specific Standard
Restricting Speech that Performs a Teaching Function, 39 U. S. F. L. Rev. 353 (2005) (discussing the
online posting of information relating to the construction of bombs and other dangerous devices).
54 By focusing on the threat of terrorism associated with the global jihad movement, I do not mean to
downplay the significance of terrorism inspired by other ideological or theological sources.
55 One might also point to a third contemporaneous development in the form of the ongoing proliferation of
the technology and materials associated with nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weaponry.
56 See AHMED FEKRY & SARA NIMIS, Preface, in MONTASSER AL-ZAYYAT, THE ROAD TO AL-QAEDA: THE
STORY OF BIN LADEN’S RIGHT-HAND MAN (2004) xi-xxi (locating al Qaeda’s role within the movement).
20
The following sketch necessarily oversimplifies matters, but it suffice for the
purpose of emphasizing these distinctions. “Salafism,” Khaled Abou El Fadl writes, “is a
creed founded in the late nineteenth century by Muslim reformers” who contended that
“on all issues, Muslims ought to return to the original textual sources of the Qu’ran and
the Sunna (precedent) of the Prophet.”57 According to El Fadl, it was not an anti-
modernist or reactionary creed at that time,58 but became so over time as it converged
with Wahhabism to form what El Fadl describes as the “puritan” strain of Islamic
thought.59 Wahabbism originated with the writings of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab,
an 18th century evangelist who objected to a wide array of practices and perspectives of
the Muslims of his day as incompatible with the original understanding of Islam.60 Over
time – particularly as the result of an alliance between al-Wahhab’s intellectual
successors and the dynasty that eventually established the Saudi Arabian state –
Wahhabism came to be highly-influential.61
These influences became significant in the thought of Sayyid Qutb, a mid-20th
century Egyptian intellectual whose writings are often cited as foundational to the
subsequent emergence of the jihad movement.62 Qutb’s 1964 book Milestones, which
has been described as the “manifesto of the Salafi jihad and its later global variant,”63
contended that the Muslim governments of his day were in a state of jahiliyya, which is
57 KHALED M. ABOU EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT: WRESTLING ISLAM FROM THE EXTREMISTS (2005) 75.
58 See id. at 76-77.
59 See id. at 79-80.
60 See id. at 45-51. El Fadl contends that al-Wahhab was in fact advancing an interpretation of Islam
heavily reflective of the strict cultural norms of the Bedouin society of which he was part. See id.
61 See id. at 62-74.
62 See id. at 81-83. See also ADNAN A. MUSALLAM, FROM SECULARISM TO JIHAD: SAYYID QUTB AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF RADICAL ISLAMISM (2005) (exploring the evolution of Qutb’s thought); SAGEMAN, supra
note 27, at 8-14 (discussing Qutb’s influence).
63 SAGEMAN, supra note 27, at 9.
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to say that they were not true Muslims. 64 Milestones thus provided theological
justification for resistance to government authority in Muslim states notwithstanding the
injunction against spreading discord (fitna) within the community of believers.65
There is some dispute regarding the extent to which Qutb’s writings endorsed the
use of violence to advance that goal. Some describe him as contending that preaching
(dawa) would not suffice to bring about the restoration of a true Islamic order, and
advocating instead that “[s]triving through the use of the sword (jihad bis sayf) must clear
the way for striving through preaching”66 and that armed struggle in the name of jihad
should be understood offensively rather than merely in terms of narrow self-defense.67
Others describe Qutb as “reluctan[t] to resort to military force.”68 In any event, Qutb’s
ideas were particularly influential among Egyptian dissident groups in the 1970s, and
these groups did indeed embrace the need for immediate armed struggle against the
Egyptian government.69
In the 1980s, these ideas spread beyond Egypt thanks in significant part to the
catalyzing effect of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet’s invasion triggered a
call to participate in a relatively traditional form of jihad in that the struggle was
defensive in nature, a response to armed aggression by a non-Muslim power against a
Muslim state.70 Thousands from across the Muslim world responded by traveling to
64 FEKRY & NIMIS, supra note 56, at xvi.
65 SAGEMAN, supra note 27, at 9-14.
66 Id. at 12 (paraphrasing Qutb’s viewpoint).
67 Id. (quoting Qutb’s statement that ‘[i]f we insist on calling Islamic Jihad a defensive movement, then we
must change the meaning of the word ‘defense’ and mean by it the ‘defense of man’ against those elements
that limit his freedom”).
68 EL FADL, supra note 57, at 86.
69 See SAGEMAN, supra note 27, at 14-17. See also DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF
SACRED TERROR 78 (2003) (noting influence of Qutb on subsequent Egyptian radicals).
70 BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 69 at 99 (noting that the call for a defensive jihad against the Soviets
“resonated loudly”).
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Afghanistan to fight as mujahedin, and many more contributed through the donation of
funds and other resources to the jihadist cause.71 One did not have to subscribe to
Salafism or Wahhabism in order to join the struggle, let alone the substrain of thought
that viewed the use of violence as an appropriate means of propagating the true faith.
Nonetheless, the conflict provided an unprecedented milieu for circulation of such views
– an ideo-theological crucible – while at the same time creating a dense transnational
social network connecting a vast body of both fighters and financial backers.72
Inevitably, tension emerged between traditionalists (who viewed armed jihad as
legitimate against the Soviets in Afghanistan, but were disinclined to turn the network
against Muslim governments) and others, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri of Egypt, who were
eager to leverage the resources and capacities of the mujahedin network for use against
their own governments.73 The most significant organizer among the jihadists at that time
– Sheikh Abdallah Azzam – took the traditionalist view.74 With financial support from
Osama bin Laden, Azzam had founded the Mekhtab al-Khidemat (Service Bureau) and
other logistical support structures – including training camps – to facilitate the flow of
fighters and resources into Afghanistan.75 In the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, and in
keeping with the traditionalist perspective, Azzam’s inclination was to turn the jihad
infrastructure that had been established – the “base,” or al Qaeda – toward the support of
similar projects aimed at ejecting non-Muslim governments or threats from current or
71 See STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN
FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 155 (2004).
72 SAGEMAN, supra note 27, at 18, 34-39. See generally COLL, supra note 71.
73 See COLL, supra note 71, at 203-04; SAGEMAN, supra note 27, at 36-37.
74 See COLL, supra note 71, at 203-04. See also AL-ZAYYAT, supra note 56, 69 (observing that Azzam
“was not interested in clashing with the Arab governments that supported him”).
75 See COLL, supra note 71, at 155.
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formerly Muslim lands such as Kashmir and Bosnia.76 But Azzam was killed in a car-
bomb explosion in 1989, leaving control of the Azzam’s organization, such as it was,
largely in the hands of individuals who accepted the necessity for an offensive approach
to armed jihad.77 Bin Laden, who appears to have come around to this less traditional
perspective in part through the influence of al-Zawahiri, 78 was perhaps the most
significant of these leaders. He eventually seized the reins of the organization.79
By the 1990s, the entity that eventually became known as al Qaeda had evolved in
several significant ways. First, although it continued its legacy function (tracing back to
the Mekhtab al-Khidemat) of providing logistical support for the activities of other like-
minded groups (through funding, training, and coordination), it also began planning and
executing its own operations.80 Second, it spearheaded a critical doctrinal development
in terms of the locus of jihadist efforts. Instead of focusing on the “near enemy” (i.e.,
allegedly apostate Muslim governments such as the Mubarak government in Egypt), al
Qaeda eventually advanced the view that the priority of the jihad movement should be the
“far enemy” in the form of the West, particularly the United States, on the theory that
local apostate regimes could not be removed so long as they retained the support of
Western powers, particularly the United States.81 Third, al Qaeda clearly asserted the
propriety – indeed, the duty – of targeting civilians rather than just government personnel
in pursuit of these goals.82
76 SAGEMAN, supra note 27, at 36.
77 Id. at 37. See also COLL, supra note 71, at 204.
78 See AL-ZAYYAT, supra note 56, 68-69.
79 See COLL, supra note 71, at 204.
80 See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, FINAL
REPORT ch. 2 (2004) (describing the emergence of al Qaeda in the 1990s).
81 See, e.g., FEKRY & NIMIS, supra note 56, at xvii-xviii.
82 See SAGEMAN, supra note 27, at 47; World Islamic Front Statement, Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders
(Feb. 23, 1998), in LAQUEUR, VOICES, supra note 46, at 410 (reprinting 1998 fatwa on behalf of al Qaeda
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Al Qaeda arguably reached its peak in organizational terms during this pre-9/11
period, maintaining a relatively traditional hierarchical structure and occupying a position
at the hub of a network of groups, subnetworks, and individuals subscribing to varying
degrees to its ideological perspective. Even at its peak, however, it was never the case
that all uses of armed force in the name of jihad could be attributed to it. In any event, al
Qaeda’s formal structure appears to have degraded since this period as a result of the
post-9/11 destruction of its facilities in Afghanistan, the death or capture of substantial
numbers of its pre-9/11 leadership and operatives, and the limited ability of remaining
members to communicate while remaining at liberty.83 At the same time, the ideo-
theological agenda that al Qaeda advances – including the goal of establishing a pan-
Islamic state consistent with Salafist-Wahhabist principles, the necessity of removing
American support for secular governments in Muslim states, and the propriety of using
violence against civilians – remains a potent force, and has begun to manifest itself in a
far more decentralized manner.
Michael Scheuer – formerly the head of the CIA station devoted specifically to
bin Laden and al Qaeda – recently warned that “it is . . . vital to understand that [bin
Laden] has never claimed that al-Qaeda could achieve this goal by itself. Quite the
contrary, he has consistently maintained that al-Qaeda is only the vanguard of the large-
scale movement that is needed to achieve this goal.”84 In Scheuer’s view, moreover, bin
Laden has had considerable success with this strategy. He describes such recent events
and four other organizations declaring that killing “the Americans and their allies – civilians and military –
is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it”).
83 See James Fallows, Declaring Victory, THE ATL. MONTHLY, September 2006.
84 Michael Scheuer, Toronto, London, and the Jihadi Spring: Bin Laden as Successful Instigator, 22
TERRORISM FOCUS 6, 7 (2006), available at
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/tf_003_022.pdf.
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as the discovery of the Toronto plot in the summer of 2006 as just the latest examples in a
“series of events that now stretch back over three-plus years,” each involving militants
acting independently of but inspired by al Qaeda in locations ranging from London to
Bangladesh.85 “Today,” Scheuer concludes, “the United States and Europe are not only
confronted by a still undefeated al-Qaeda, but by an increasing number of Muslims in
their own populations who—inspired and religiously agitated by bin Laden—are
prepared to pick up arms and spend their lives to act on that inspiration.”86
This is precisely what Admiral Redd of NCTC meant when he testified to the
threat posed by “new networks . . . often made up of disaffected, radicalized individuals
who draw inspiration and moral support from al-Qa’ida and other violent extremists,”
and when he warned that “[w]e have begun to see cells like these here in the United
States.”87 It also explains FBI Director Robert Mueller’s recent statement that
the convergence of globalization and technology has created a new brand of
terrorism. Today, terrorist threats may come from smaller, more loosely-defined
individuals and cells who are not affiliated with al Qaeda, but who are inspired by
a violent jihadist message. These homegrown terrorists may prove to be as
dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so. We have already seen this new
face of terrorism on a global scale in Madrid, London, and Toronto. We have also
witnessed this so-called ‘self-radicalization’ here at home.88
In summary, al Qaeda is representative of but not identical to the ideo-theological
movement referred to in this article as (for the sake of convenience) the “global jihad
movement.” That movement has had many manifestations other than al Qaeda over the
years, and in the wake of 9/11appears to be more decentralized than had been the case
85 Id. at 7-8.
86 Id. at 8.
87 Redd, supra note 40; See also Reuters, U.S. Officials Seeing New Home-Grown Terror Cells,
ABCNEWS.COM, June 14, 2006, at http://abcnews.go.com/US/print?id=2072248 (quoting Senator Biden as
stating that “[e]veryone I’ve spoken to in the intelligence community says there are more cells now in the
United States”). 
88 FBI Director Robert Mueller, Remarks to the City Club of Cleveland (June 23, 2006), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller062306.htm.
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during the 1990s at the peak of al Qaeda’s efforts to orchestrate the activities of its
constituent parts. Some aspects of the global jihad movement thus have always been
“unaffiliated,” and at least in the near term this will tend to be true more and more
frequently in cases involving Muslim extremists suspected of involvement in terrorism.
These trends reduce the government’s options for incapacitating potentially-
dangerous persons in several respects. First, even assuming that military detention of
enemy combatants remains a legally and politically viable option for al Qaeda suspects
within the United States, the grounds for using that approach with respect to a suspect
unaffiliated with al Qaeda are comparatively weak. Second, as Director Redd warned,
some instances of unaffiliated terrorism involve U.S. citizens who are not amenable to
immigration enforcement as an alternative form of preventive intervention. For both of
these reasons, criminal law enforcement is far and away the most plausible option
available when the unaffiliated terrorism scenario arises (aside, of course, from the option
of remaining in an evidence- and intelligence-gathering mode). But as noted previously,
the most useful tools for intervening at the earliest possible stage – § 2339B and § 1705 –
by definition have no application in this context. In such cases, DOJ’s anticipatory
prosecution power instead turns on its capacity to link the suspect directly to the prospect
of a future act of violence. That is, DOJ in that context must rely on its capacity to
prosecute inchoate crimes. As indicated below in Parts III and IV, the manner in which it
has done so presents difficult questions about the outer boundaries of conspiracy and
other forms of inchoate criminal liability.
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III. Unaffiliated Terrorism and Conspiracy Liability
If a suspected terrorist cannot be charged with providing material support to an
FTO or otherwise incapacitated on pretextual grounds, the remaining prosecutorial option
is to proceed on an inchoate crime theory based on the harmful conduct that the
government anticipates the person might commit. In light of the Justice Department’s
commitment to prosecution at the earliest possible stage, this raises a question about the
scope of inchoate crime liability. Just how early does federal law permit prosecutors to
intervene in anticipation of a criminal act?
The answer depends on two closely-related questions of conspiracy liability. First,
how specific must an evolving agreement be before it becomes possible to characterize it
as a crime? That is, does conspiracy liability attach at the point that discussions become
specific as to a particular type of offense to be committed, or is more detail required?
Second, even assuming the existence of a sufficiently-specific objective among some
individuals, how broadly may the net of conspiracy liability be cast? That is, in what
circumstances may persons who are not in direct contact with one another be found to be
part of a single conspiracy?
I begin this section with an overview of how these questions would be answered
as a matter of what might be described as the “general rules” of federal conspiracy
liability, by which I mean to refer to the doctrinal rules that would be applied to
prosecutions under the general federal conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371) and
comparable provisions. I then examine how these rules have been applied in the context
of terrorism-related conspiracies, using a case study of practice under a particularly-
significant statute – 18 U.S.C. § 956 – to examine the extent to which prosecutors have
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pushed the envelope since 9/11 with respect to the boundaries of conspiracy liability.
Although I conclude that most such prosecutions fit comfortably within the expansive
scope of conspiracy liability, there are circumstances involving the global jihad
movement in which the limits of that liability at least arguably have been exceeded.
A. The Role of Conspiracy Liability
The concept of conspiracy liability has long had its detractors.89 Some criticisms
are rooted in the procedural and evidentiary advantages that accrue to the prosecution in
such cases.90 Others have more to do with the nature of inchoate crime itself, and in
particular with the policy tensions inherent in all preventive prosecution:
“When a person is seriously dedicated to commission of a crime, a firm legal
basis is needed for the intervention of the agencies of law enforcement to prevent
its consummation. In determining that basis, there must be attention to the danger
of abuse; equivocal behavior may be misconstrued by the unfriendly eye as
preparation to commit a crime. It is no less important, on the other side, that lines
should not be drawn so rigidly that the police confront insoluble dilemmas in
deciding when to intervene, facing the risk that if they wait the crime may be
committed while if they act they may not yet have any valid charge.”91
These tensions are particularly acute in the context of terrorism prevention. There,
the stated preference for intervention at the earliest possible stage may lead prosecutors to
act in circumstances in which the evidence is less well-developed than might otherwise
be the case, thus exacerbating the prospects both for false positives and, possibly, false
negatives (i.e., unsuccessful prosecutions of individuals who are in fact dangerous).
89 See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (contending
that the “modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition,” and cataloguing pro-
government aspects of the doctrine); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 616 (4th ed. 2003) (arguing that
“the vagueness stems from . . . [among other things,] the uncertainty over what is sufficient to constitute the
agreement and what attendant mental state must be shown”).
90 For a review of these advantages, see Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 453; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL
PENAL CODE, § 5.03, Comment 1, p.389.
91 MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment to Article 5 293-94 (1985).
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Accordingly, it is important to understand precisely how early it is that conspiracy law
permits prosecutors to act.
In general, the point of potential intervention arises sooner with respect to
conspiracies than it does when a single individual is involved.92 Whereas an individual
becomes liable for attempt only where his or her intent to commit an unlawful act is
joined with conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward completion of that act,93
conspiracy liability typically attaches the moment that such intent is joined simply with
an agreement formed among two or more individuals to achieve that purpose.94 Some
statutes also require commission of an overt act in furtherance of that goal, but even when
this is so the overt act requirement does not require conduct rising to the level of the
substantial-step standard associated with the law of attempt. Thus, prosecutors in the
conspiracy context in theory may intervene at a very early stage: if not at the moment the
conspiratorial agreement is struck, then soon thereafter when an overt act takes place.
Determining precisely when that intervention point has arrived is not, however, a
simple matter. The problem is not simply that the agreement may be reached implicitly
rather than overtly.95 In practice, the agreement is not always “struck” at a discrete point
in time. In some instances, the agreement instead comes into being organically over time
via a sequence of communications and interactions, a process that may prove to be
92 Cf. Peter Buscenni, Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1122, 1122 n.5 (1975) (observing that conspiracy in general provides “an opportunity for earlier
intervention” than attempt, which typically requires evidence of a much greater degree of progress toward
completion of the contemplated criminal act).
93 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 90, at § 5.01(1)(c).
94
“As an inchoate crime, conspiracy fixes the point of legal intervention at agreement to commit a crime,
or at agreement coupled with an overt act which may, however, be of very small significance.” Id. at § 5.03,
comment 1, p. 387.
95 As one treatise has observed, “[t]here are few, if any criminal conspiracies in which a writing sets forth
the terms of the agreement.” Mark Pomerantz & Otto G. Obermaier, Defending Charges of Conspiracy, in
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES (Otto G. Obermaier and Robert G.
Morvillo, eds.) § 4.02[1], 4-14 (2006)
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particularly common in connection with the global jihad movement. The issue of how
soon conspiracy law lets prosecutors intervene thus depends in the first instance on the
standard the law provides for recognizing that such interactions have evolved to the point
at which an actionable agreement has been formed. That is, the law must have some
means to distinguish between interactions that are too indefinite or indeterminate – and
thus too preliminary – to constitute a conspiratorial agreement, and those with sufficient
detail for liability to attach.
Relatedly, the law also must distinguish between situations involving an
individual but sprawling conspiracy and those involving closely-related but distinct
conspiracies. This is particularly important where a sufficiently-specific agreement
clearly exists as to one set of individuals, but the question is close as to others who are
not in direct contact with the former group. In the pages that follow, I identify the
“general rules” governing both of these questions, and consider the extent to which they
hold true for terrorism prosecutions.
B. The “General Rules” Regarding the Scope of Conspiratorial Agreements
It is conventional to describe the scope of a conspiracy as consisting of two
elements: the “party dimension” and the “object dimension.”96 The former refers to the
determination of which individuals are party to an alleged agreement, though in some
contexts this also becomes an inquiry into whether there are multiple conspiracies or just
one overarching agreement.97 The latter ordinarily refers to the determination of which
goals count as the objects of the particular agreement in question, with difficulties arising
either when (i) the asserted object is clearly identified but is not clearly within the
96 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 12.3(b) (2d ed. 2003).
97 See id. § 12.3(b)(2).
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substantive scope of the conspiracy statute or (ii) it is unclear just what it is, if anything,
that the alleged conspirators have agreed to do. 98 These inquiries are, of course,
interrelated.
1. Identifying the Parties to the Agreement(s)
Difficult questions arise when prosecutors seek to extend conspiracy liability to a
group of individuals not in direct contact with one another, particularly where the
defendants can plausibly argue that distinct conspiracies are in issue. This subject is
much-discussed in the literature, and usually is framed as an inquiry into the scope of two
structural models:
(1) the so-called “wheel” or “circle” conspiracy, in which there is a single person
or group (the “hub”) dealing individually with two or more other persons or
groups (the “spokes”); and (2) the “chain” conspiracy, usually involving the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer.99
Both models can involve individuals who are not in direct contact with one
another but who may nonetheless be found to be part of a single conspiracy in light of
their shared understanding of and intent to participate in the overarching plan or scheme.
As between the two, it is the wheel model that “is by its nature less likely to support the
conclusion that the parties had a community of interest.” 100 Even in that context,
however, courts have proved willing to cast a wide net in defining the extent to which the
separate spokes may be said to be involved in a single conspiracy via the intermediation
of the hub.
98 See id. § 12.3(b)(1).
99 LAFAVE, supra note 96, at 293. The models can, of course, be combined. See, e.g., McCormack, supra
note 26, at 11 (discussing chain-wheel conspiracy).
100 LAFAVE, supra note 96 at 295.
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In United States v. Baker, for example, the 11th Circuit acknowledged that
“[w]hen a charged conspiracy centers around a central organizer or organizers . . . the
Government must establish that a given defendant was party to that central conspiracy,
rather than to a separate and uncharged conspiracy with one of the organizers.”101 But
“the defendant need not participate in all the activities forming the larger conspiracy, so
long as he is aware of the general scope and purpose of the conspiratorial agreement.”102
The critical issue, the court concluded, is “whether the different sub-groups are acting in
furtherance of one overarching plan.” 103 Thus the various distribution chains in a
narcotics prosecution can be said to be part of a single conspiracy, despite their limited-
to-nonexistent contact with one another, where the participants in one spoke-chain know
or should know of the existence of others acting in furtherance of the common
enterprise.104 In contrast, where an individual (the “hub”) repeatedly engaged in loan
fraud under the National Housing Act on behalf of a variety of other individuals who
were unaware of one another and who had no reason to presume one another’s existence,
the Supreme Court concluded that the several instances did not constitute a single
conspiracy because “[t]here was no drawing of all together in a single, over-all
comprehensive scheme.”105
2. Identifying the Objects of the Agreement(s)
Assuming for the sake of argument that only a single potential conspiracy is in
issue, a separate question arises as to when preliminary interactions evolve to the point
101 432 F.3d 1189, 1232 (2005) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 755 (1946)).
102 Id. (citations omitted).
103 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
104 See LAFAVE, supra note 96, at § 12(b)(2), at 294-95 & n. 74 (discussing examples of United States v.
Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, 308 U.S. 298 (1939), and United States v. Borelli,
336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964)).
105 Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558 (1947) (commenting on Kotteakos, 328 U.S.750)).
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that a cognizable agreement can be said to exist. Most conspiracy statutes – including the
general federal conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 371 – are silent regarding the issue of
agreement specificity, leaving the issue to be worked out in the caselaw. Unfortunately,
opinions addressing the point are surprisingly few and far between. This probably
reflects the fact that most conspiracy prosecutions are not truly preventive in nature, and
thus provide little occasion for inquiries into this aspect of the agreement element;
typically, defendants allegedly have completed or at least attempted to carry out the
objective of the conspiracy before they are prosecuted, leaving little room to raise
questions regarding the specificity of the alleged objective. Nonetheless, the question has
arisen from time to time, and courts have been reasonably clear and consistent in
resolving it. As the cases discussed below illustrate, the general rule is that an agreement
is sufficiently specific for conspiracy liability to attach when the conspirators concur as to
the type of offense to be committed, even if the details of execution – where, when, and
how the offense will be committed – are yet to be determined.
a. Agreement as to the Type of Offense – a Necessary Condition?
A pair of Second Circuit cases illustrates the point that an agreement must at least
be specific as to the type of illicit objective to be achieved in order for conspiracy liability
to attach. In United States v. Gallishaw,106 the Second Circuit reviewed the conviction of
Ernest Gallishaw for conspiring to rob a federally-insured bank. The evidence at trial
demonstrated that Gallishaw had provided an automatic weapon to a group of men who
subsequently robbed a bank. Gallishaw had not participated directly in the robbery,
though his gun was used during the crime. A witness at trial testified that Gallishaw had
been told at the time he handed over the gun that it would be used for the “bank job” or,
106 428 F.2d 760, 762 (2d Cir. 1970).
34
failing that, to “pull some other job.” During deliberations, the jury requested additional
instruction with respect to whether Gallishaw could be found guilty if the jury concluded
that he did not know the use to which the gun would be put. The trial judge’s answer:
they could convict Gallishaw so long as he knew that “there was a conspiracy to do
something wrong and to use the gun to violate the law.”107
That ruling suggested a particularly low-threshold for the level of specificity
required in order for a conspiratorial agreement to exist: knowledge of a general unlawful
intent on the part of others would suffice. And Gallishaw duly was convicted. The
Second Circuit vacated and reversed, however, ruling that the trial judge had misstated
the law. A conspirator, the Second Circuit explained, must at least “know what kind of
criminal conduct was in fact contemplated.”108
A similar result occurred in United States v. Rosenblatt,109 a case which involved
the prosecution of Rabbi Elyakim Rosenblatt for his role in an alleged conspiracy to
defraud the federal government. Rosenblatt’s alleged co-conspirator, Morris Brooks, had
taken advantage of employment at the headquarters of the Manhattan Postal Service in
order to fraudulently induce the government to issue eight checks worth more than
$180,000. Brooks then obtained Rosenblatt’s assistance in laundering the money.
Critically, however, Brooks did not admit to Rosenblatt that he had defrauded the
government to obtain the checks. Instead, he told Rosenblatt that the checks were issued
legitimately but that laundering was needed in order to enable the payees to avoid tax
obligations and to conceal the fact that some checks had been issued as part of a kickback
107 Id. at 762.
108 Id. at 763 n.1.
109 554 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1977).
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scheme.110 In short, by agreeing to assist Brooks, Rosenblatt intended to facilitate illegal
acts, but not the same illegal acts actually committed by Brooks. Rosenblatt nonetheless
was convicted under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, for conspiring to
defraud the United States.111
The Second Circuit again reversed. Rosenblatt and Brooks had a meeting of the
minds at one level of generality in that they had agreed to cooperate in a course of
fraudulent conduct, but they lacked agreement at a more specific level because Brooks
had misled Rosenblatt regarding the nature of the offense to be committed. As the
Second Circuit framed the issue, the matter thus turned “on the degree of specificity that
is required as to the agreement.”112 The court concluded that the degree of agreement in
this instance was too generalized to support liability.113 “[I]t is clear,” the court explained,
“that a general agreement to engage in unspecific criminal conduct is insufficient to
identify the essential nature of the conspiratorial plan.”114 In conclusion, the court stated,
“just as the particular offense must be specified under the ‘offense’ branch” of § 371, so
too “the fraudulent scheme must be alleged and proved under the conspiracy-to-defraud
clause.”115
Gallishaw and Rosenblatt stand for the proposition that agreement as to the
particular type of offense to be committed is a necessary condition for conspiracy liability
to attach.116 But they leave open the question whether that level of agreement also counts
110 See id. at 37-38.
111 See id. at 37.
112 Id. at 38.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 39.
115 Id. at 42.
116 See also United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1980) (requiring agreement to “commit a
particular offense and not merely a vague agreement to do something wrong”).
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as a sufficient condition, or if instead prosecutors also must prove agreement regarding
the at least some of the details of executing the objective, such as method, time, or target.
b. Agreement as to Type of Offense –a Sufficient Condition?
It is “axiomatic in the law of conspiracy,” one court has written, “that all of the
defendants need not have knowledge of all of the details of the conspiracy” in order for
liability to attach.117 Instead, “[t]o sustain [a] conspiracy conviction, there need only be a
showing that [the] defendant knew of the conspiracy’s purpose,” in addition of course to
evidence that the defendant agreed to and intended the achievement of that purpose.118
But does it suffice if the defendant’s understanding of the purpose is limited to the
category of offense to be committed and does not include any particulars with respect to
the particular target of the offense, the date it will be attempted, or the manner in which it
will achieved?
Williamson v. United States,119 an early-20th century decision of the Supreme
Court, suggests that agreement as to the particulars of the offense to be committed is not
required above and beyond agreement as to the nature of the offense itself. In that case,
the Court upheld the conviction of John Newton Williamson, who while a member of the
House of Representatives had been indicted for conspiracy to suborn perjury. 120
Prosecutors had alleged that Representative Williamson was involved in a plot to have
numerous individuals make false statements in order to obtain public lands in Oregon
which then would be transferred to the control of the conspirators. 121 Williamson
117 United States v. Krasner, 841 F. Supp. 649, 659 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (citing United States v. Janotti, 729
F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1990)). See also United States v.
Whittington, 26 F.3d 456, 465 (4th Cir. 1994) (same).
118 Whittington, 26 F.3d at 465 (quoting United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1245 (4th Cir. 1984)).
119 207 U.S. 425 (1908).
120 See id.
121 See id.
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objected that the conspiracy charge was fatally defective in that the government had
neither pled nor proved that the conspirators knew whom they would ask to make such
false statements, nor when they would do so. 122 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, stating that “all that is requisite in stating the object of the conspiracy” is “a
common intent, sufficient to identify the offense which the defendant conspired to
commit.”123 “It was not essential to the commission of the crime,” the Court explained,
“that in the minds of the conspirators the precise persons to be suborned, or the time and
place of such suborning, should have been agreed upon.”124
The Court reached a similar conclusion eleven years later in Frohwerk v. United
States.125 It is a decision far more well-known for Justice Holmes’ much-criticized
determination that the First Amendment did not protect the publishers of a German-
language newspaper espousing anti-war sentiments from conviction on charges of
conspiring to interfere with military recruiting, but Frohwerk had not appealed his
conviction on First Amendment grounds alone. He also had argued in the alternative that
the conspiracy charge against him was deficient for lack of specificity. In particular, he
argued that the government failed to plead the means by which the conspiracy’s objective
(to disrupt military recruiting) was to be carried out. Holmes was unpersuaded. A
“conspiracy to obstruct recruiting,” he wrote, “would be criminal even if no means were
agreed upon specifically by which to accomplish the intent.”126
122 Id. at 447.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 449.
125 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
126 Id. at 209. A similar sentiment appears as dicta in a similar case from that era, Pierce v. United States,
where the Court stated that a conspiracy “is none the less punishable because the conspirators fail to agree
in advance upon the precise method in which the law shall be violated.” 252 U.S. 239, 244 (1920).
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These sentiments reappeared in 1947’s Blumenthal v. United States,127 where the
Court held that defendants may be convicted of conspiracy only “upon showing
sufficiently the essential nature of the plan” and the defendants’ “connections with it,
without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation of
others.”128 Noting that “[s]ecrecy and concealment are essential features of successful
conspiracy,” Justice Rutledge explained that the rule could not be otherwise in light of
the practical difficulties that an alternative rule would impose.129
These decisions suggest two closely-related propositions. First, and most clearly,
an individual defendant may be liable for conspiracy even without knowledge of the
particulars of how a conspiratorial objective is to be achieved. That rule is clearly stated
in Blumenthal, and has been extensively restated in the lower courts. 130 Might it
nonetheless be necessary, though, for the prosecution to prove that the agreement did
become focused with respect to at least some details of execution, regardless of the state
of knowledge of any one individual defendant? It would seem unlikely, in light of the
first rule, and in any event Williamson and Frohwerk reject that possibility.
3. Summarizing the General Rules
The preceding discussion suggests a set of three rules that help to define the scope
of conspiracy liability. First, the alleged agreement must have evolved to the point of
127 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947).
128 Id. at 557 (italics added) (citing Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1937); Lefco v. United
States, 74 F.2d 66 (3rd Cir. 1934); Jezewski v. United States, 13 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1926); Allen v. United
States, 4 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1925). See also Williamson v. United States, 19 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1927)
(upholding jury instruction that “[i]t is enough if a man, understanding that there is a crowd banded
together to break the law, knowing in a general way what the purposes of the crowd are in that respect,
becomes a member of it and acts with them to a greater or lesser extent.”).
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., United States v. LaSpina, 299 F.3d 165, 176 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The conspirators had agreed to
launder the proceeds of the scheme” in violation of federal law, and thus “did not have to agree further on
the details of each transaction in furtherance of that objective”).
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becoming specific as to the type of offense to be committed. Second, there is no need to
prove that the agreement evolved further to the point of specifying the details of
executing the offense, such as the intended victim or target, the date of the offense, or the
persons, methods, and materials to be used in carrying out the offense. Third, individuals
who are not in direct contact with one another, nor even actually aware of one another,
nonetheless may be deemed to be part of a single conspiracy where they understand that
they are part of a single, overarching plan and where they know or should know that
others must also be part of the plan in order for it to be achieved. Going forward, I shall
refer to these as the “general rules” regarding agreement specificity.
C. Terrorism Conspiracies
The general rules permit prosecutors to intervene at a relatively early stage in the
planning process, and in doing so to cast a broad net of liability. Both qualities are
conducive to the goal of maximizing anticipatory prosecution in the terrorism context.
Assume for example that the FBI is monitoring the activities of two individuals known to
support the goals of the global jihad movement. If those individuals can be shown to
have agreed to carry out a truck-bomb attack, prosecutors have the option of intervening
at that point without having to await evidence that the suspects have chosen a particular
target or have begun assembling explosives. Even if the fact pattern is modified such that
there is one cell involved in constructing the bomb while another is strictly responsible
for financing the project, the entire group may yet be subject to prosecution for the single
conspiracy.
What would happen, however, if the suspects are not directly linked to any
particular plot? Might prosecutors nonetheless be able to bring a conspiracy prosecution
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based on the involvement of the defendants in the affairs of an FTO or even the global
jihad movement itself? The answers to these questions define the outer limits of
conspiracy liability in the terrorism context.131
1. Core Applications of the General Rules in Terrorism Cases
There is no single federal statute criminalizing “terrorism” as such. Rather, there
are a wide variety of violent crime provisions that concern conduct that may be viewed as
terrorism in certain circumstances. 132 Most of these statute provide directly for
conspiracy liability, 133 sparing prosecutors the need to rely instead on the general
conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371) and thus permitting much higher maximum
sentences.134 But with one potential exception, they are comparable to § 371 in that
nothing in their text arguably calls for a departure from the general rules.
The Second Circuit’s 1998 decision in United States v. Salameh, arising out of the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, illustrates the applicability of the general rules in this
context.135 Approximately seven months after the bombing, a grand jury in the Southern
District of New York indicted six individuals on a variety of charges, including
conspiracy. In particular, the indictment alleged that the men had formed an agreement
to commit at least four offenses: 18 U.S.C. § 33 (using explosives to attack vehicles used
in interstate commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (transportation of explosives across state
131 The extent to which 18 U.S.C. § 2339A might provide criminal liability in circumstances beyond the
scope of conspiracy liability is discussed in Part IV, infra.
132 A representative list of relevant criminal statutes is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. See Appendix A,
infra (identifying predicate offenses listed in § 2339A).
133 See id. (indicating those that provide directly for conspiracy liability).
134 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(c)(1)(F) (providing that the penalty for attempting or conspiring to commit
an offense under § 2332b shall be the same as that for the completed offense, entailing penalties up to and
including the death penalty); 18 U.S.C. § 844(m) (providing twenty-year maximum sentence for
conspiracies to violate § 844(h), which in turn criminalizes the carrying or use of explosives in connection
with other felonies). The maximum sentence under § 371 is five years’ imprisonment.
135 For further discussion of the significance of this case as an illustration of conspiracy liability in the
terrorism context, see McCormack, supra note 26, at 6-7.
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lines for purposes of attacking property); 18 U.S.C. § 844(f) (bombing property or
vehicles owned by the United States government; and 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (bombing
buildings involved in interstate commerce). At trial, defendant Mahmoud Abouhalima
requested a jury instruction to the effect that the government was obliged to prove that he
had specifically intended to attack the World Trade Center, as opposed to proving that he
had a more generalized intent to carry out attacks against unspecified targets. The trial
judge declined to give such an instruction, and the Second Circuit affirmed that decision.
“The indictment does not charge the defendants with conspiring to bomb the World
Trade Center,” the court wrote, but instead with conspiring to “bomb buildings, vehicles
and property of the United States” in a general sense.136 The particular bombing the
defendants actually executed certainly constituted an overt act in furtherance of the
agreement, but conspiracy liability attached without respect to whether any of the
defendants specifically contemplated making the World Trade Center their target; it was
enough that they had agreed at a general level to carry out a bombing campaign.137
On this understanding of conspiracy liability, prosecutors could have intervened
with these same charges if they had known of the plot in advance of the bombing, even if
they was uncertainty regarding the particular target to be attacked. Indeed, this resembles
what happened in the summer of 2006 in connection with the arrests of the Seas of David
defendants in Miami.138 Among other things, the indictment in United States v. Batiste
charges that the defendants conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f) and 844(i), with
136 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 146 (2d Cir. 1998).
137 See id. See also id. at 147-48 (rejecting similar argument that the trial judge had improperly instructed
the jury with respect to the requirement that the government prove a defendant’s knowledge of the
“essential nature of the plan,” noting that the instructions spoke clearly in terms of the four types of
offenses described as the object of the conspiracy and concluding that this sufficiently “guarded against the
possibility that Ajaj would be convicted of merely entering into ‘a general agreement to engage in
unspecified criminal conduct’”) (citations omitted).
138 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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particular reference to the FBI building in Miami and the Sears Tower in Chicago.139
Salameh makes clear, moreover, that these same charges would have been available even
if the defendants had not yet determined which particular buildings they hoped to strike.
From that point of view, Batiste does not actually represent intervention at the earliest
possible point at which conspiracy liability would have attached.
We might think of prosecutions such as Salameh and Batiste as examples of the
relatively-uncontroversial “core” form of anticipatory prosecution made possible by
conspiracy liability. But does such liability extend beyond the core?
In the pages that follow, I rely on a particular terrorism-related conspiracy statute
– 18 U.S.C. § 956 – as a window onto this question. This makes sense for several
reasons. First, as the data provided below will demonstrate, prosecutions under § 956
have played a particularly important role in post-9/11 terrorism cases. Second, the fact
patterns in these prosecutions can be grouped in ways that help to illustrate the extent to
which post-9/11 conspiracy prosecutions have moved beyond the core scenario described
above. Third, § 956 prosecutions also serve as the most common predicate offense for
terrorism-related prosecutions under a separate statute – 18 U.S.C. § 2339A – which is
the focus of discussion in Part IV, infra. Finally, § 956 is unique among the terrorism-
related conspiracy statutes in terms of the extent to which its text expressly engages the
question of agreement specificity.
2. Origins and Evolution of § 956
Section 956 originally was intended to protect the federal government’s control
over foreign affairs by regulating the private projection of force outside the United
139 United States v. Batiste, 06-cr-20373 (S.D.Fla.) (indictment) (on file with author), at 9-10 (Count 3).
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States.140 It originated in 1917 as part of the legislative package generally known as the
Espionage Act,141 enacted in the special session of Congress that included America’s
declaration of war against the Imperial German Government.142
As originally drafted, the statute would have criminalized conspiracies “to injure
or destroy property of a foreign government . . . with which the United States is at
peace,” so long as that property is “situated within a foreign country,” the act would be “a
felony under the laws of such country,” and at least one overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy occurs within the U.S.143 But this formulation prompted sharp objections
during hearings on the bill, on the ground that it might be construed to apply to persons in
the U.S. who provided general financial support to overseas independence movements.144
The version of § 956 eventually enacted reflected a compromise to avoid such a
construction, making it a crime for “two or more persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States” to “conspire to injure or destroy specific property situated within a foreign
country and belonging to a foreign Government . . . with which the United States is at
peace.”145 Adding additional emphasis, the statute also included a clause at the end
providing that “[a]ny indictment or information under this section shall describe the
specific property which it was the object of the conspiracy to injure or destroy.”146
140 Federal criminal law has regulated the private projection of force since the early days of the Republic
and the passage of the Neutrality Act. See Act of 1794, Revised Statutes 5281-91 (Title 67), codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 958-962. See also Theodore B. Olson, “Application of the Neutrality Act to Official
Government Activities,” 8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 58, 59-65 (Apr. 25, 1984) (discussing origins of the
Neutrality Act); Ebenezer R. Hoar, Neutrality Act, 13 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 177, 178 (Dec. 16, 1869) (same).
141 Olson, supra note 140, at n.9.
142 Pub. L. No 65-24, 40 Stat. 217, 65th Cong., First Session (June 15, 1917).
143 The original proposed text of § 5 (the future § 956) is reprinted in.
144 See H.R. 291, Serial 53-Part 2, 65th Cong., 1st sess., at 57-61 (Apr. 9 and 12, 1917) (Hearing before the
House Committee on the Judiciary on the subject of the Act “To Punish Espionage and Interference with
Neutrality”) (hereinafter “April Hearing”); S.8148, Serial 53, 64th Cong., 2d sess., at 18-26 (Feb. 22, 1917)
(DOCE CIS Hrgs MF Gp 1—H170-6) (hereinafter “February Hearing”).
145 Section 5 (italics added).
146 Id.
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The original version of § 956 thus included language in its text explicitly
requiring prosecutors to plead and prove that the conspiratorial agreement had evolved to
the point of targeting specific property. In this respect, § 956 appeared to break with the
general rules.
Section 956 prosecutions were few and far between in the ensuing years. The
first two reported opinions involving § 956 prosecutions, however, both raised the
specificity issue. The first, United States v. Elliot,147 was relatively straightforward,
serving mainly to emphasize that § 956 did indeed require a specific target to be
identified. The case involved an alleged conspiracy to destroy a railroad bridge in
Zambia, with the goal of disrupting copper exports and thus manipulating copper
prices. 148 The defendants argued that the case against them failed to satisfy the
specificity requirement of § 956 because the government had not been consistent
regarding the identity of the particular bridge in issue. 149 The court rejected that
argument, finding it sufficient that the most recent indictment specified a single,
particular bridge.150
The second reported § 956 decision demonstrated a slightly more flexible reading
of the specificity requirement. United States v. Johnson151 involved the prosecution of a
group of IRA supporters in the United States for conspiring to destroy military
helicopters located at the Royal Air Force Station in Aldergrove, Northern Ireland.152
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that § 956 required specificity as to the
147 266 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The defendants in that case unsuccessfully raised a desuetude
defense premised on the “apparent absence of any prosecution under the statute since its promulgation in
1917.” Id. at 325.
148 See id.
149 See id. at 327.
150 See id.
151 738 F. Supp. 591 (D. Mass. 1990) (Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation).
152 See id. at 591-92.
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particular helicopters to be attacked, or at least details as to precisely where and when an
attack would occur. The magistrate judge who first considered this argument rejected
that interpretation of § 956, citing the legislative history recounted above for the
proposition that the specificity requirement was intended primarily to preclude
prosecutions based on mere support for dissident organizations which might contribute
indirectly to property damage.153 That goal could be achieved without resort to the level
of detail sought by the defendants, and thus the statute did not require that “the property
which is the object of the conspiracy to destroy . . . be described in minute detail.”154 It
was sufficient, the magistrate judge concluded, that the target in this instance had “been
delineated by number, class and location.”155 On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed this
holding, and clarified that it applied equally to the proof to be required at trial.156
There things stood in 1996,157 at which point Congress substantially expanded the
range of conduct prohibited by § 956 by (1) adding a subsection to the statute extending
conspiracy liability to agreements focused on harming people rather than property and (2)
modifying the existing statutory text to reduce its specificity requirements.158 Going
forward, the long-standing prohibition against conspiracies to destroy property abroad
would be found in subsection § 956(b), while a new, victim-focused provision –
criminalizing conspiracies to “kill, kidnap, or maim” persons abroad – became § 956(a).
153 See id. at 592.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 575-76 (1991).
157 The only other pre-1996 case involving a § 956 prosecution was United States v. McKinney, 995 F.2d
1020 (11th Cir. 1993), which was similar to Johnson in that it involved a § 956 charge against IRA
supporters interested in supporting attacks on British helicopters in Northern Ireland, but did not address
the specificity issue. See Telephone Conversations with Stephen Bronis, attorney for defendant Joseph
McColgan, and Fred Haddad, attorney for defendant Kevin McKinley, on July 11, 2006 (stating that the
specificity issue was not part of the defense theory at trial and was not otherwise litigated in the case).
158 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 704 (amending § 956).
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At the same time, Congress quietly eliminated some – though not all – of the specificity
language that previously had distinguished § 956 conspiracy liability from the general
rules.
Congress accomplished this in two ways. First, the new § 956(a) conspicuously
lacked any language suggesting that prosecutors must plead or prove the particular target
of an agreement to commit a murder, kidnapping, or act of maiming overseas. That
omission strongly suggests that the general rules regarding agreement-specificity govern
§ 956(a) prosecutions, whatever may have been the case with respect to the earlier
version of the statute.
Second, the specificity requirements that had long been part of the property-
focused version of the statute were partially removed in the new § 956(b) provision. On
one hand, Congress removed from § 956(b) the clause that had expressly required that the
indictment identify the particular property to be destroyed as the object of the conspiracy.
On the other hand, Congress did not remove the express reference to “specific property”
that also had appeared in the actual definition of the offense. This curious state of affairs
probably is best understood as reflecting a congressional intent to retain the target-
specificity requirement as an element to be proved by the government at trial, while at the
same time removing the heightened pleading standard that the earlier version of § 956
had long imposed with respect to the indictment. Ultimately, however, the question may
be moot, or at least of declining significance.
Sections 956(a) and (b) overlap considerably, particularly where terrorism is
concerned, because an agreement to blow up or otherwise attack a building or structure
(within the scope of § 956(b)) often can simultaneously be characterized as an agreement
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to harm people (within the scope of § 956(a)). While the lingering specificity
requirement of § 956(b) would present prosecutors with no obstacles where the
conspiracy in issue already has come to focus on a specific property as the target, the
requirement would require delay if investigators could prove only that the suspects had
agreed to carry out an attack on a target to be identified later. Accordingly, we should
expect prosecutors seeking to maximize their capacity for early intervention will elect the
§ 956(a) option when it is available.
In fact, this is precisely what prosecutors have done since the 1996 amendments.
As described below in Table 1, there have been six cases involving 20 individual
defendants charged directly with violating § 956 during the eight-year period following
the addition of § 956(a) to the statute.159 In every instance, prosecutors have charged §
956(a) rather than § 956(b). For all intents and purposes, then, the scope of conspiracy
liability under § 956 today is comparable to that under any other federal conspiracy
statute, at least insofar as the general rules are concerned.
TABLE 1 – Section 956 Prosecutions Between 1996 and 2004
Case Docket and
Court
Defendants
charged
under § 956
Version
of
§ 956
Nature of the Objective(s) Disposition Sentence
United States
v. Bin Laden
98-cr-1023
(S.D.N.Y.)
 Wadih El
Hage
 Ali
956(a)  “kill United States nationals
employed by the United
States military who were
serving in Somalia and on the
 El Hage:
dismissed after
jury convicted
on other
 El Hage: n/a
 Mohamad:
pending161
159 As I discuss in detail in Part IV, § 956 violations often serve as the predicate offense for prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. In that indirect context, § 956(b) does make the occasional appearance. See Part
IV, infra.
160 United States v. bin Laden, S(9) 98-cr-1023 (S.D.N.Y.) (ninth superseding indictment), ¶ 15, available
at http://www.mipt.org/pdf/binLadenetals2-98cr1023.pdf.
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Mohamed Saudi Arabian peninsula”;160
 “kill United States nationals
employed at the United
States Embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania”
 “kill United States civilians
anywhere in the world “
charges
(resulting in life
sentence)
 Mohamed:
guilty plea
United States
v. Wharton
01-cr-30998
(W.D. La.)
 Curtis
Wharton
956(a)  murder of defendant’s wife
while in Haiti
convicted life
United States
v. Ahmad
04-cr-301
(D. Conn.)
 Baber
Ahmad 
 
 Azzam
Publications
956(a)162  “murder of the enemies of
the Taliban and Chechen
Mujahideen”163
extradition
pending
n/a
United States
v. al-Arian
03-cr-77
(M.D. Fla.)
 Sami al-
Arian
 Ramadan
Shallah
 Bashir Nafi
 Sameeh
Hammoudeh
 Muhammed
al-Khatib
 Abd al Aziz
Awda
 Ghassan
Zayed Ballut
 Hatem Naji
Fariz
 Mazen al-
Najjar
§ 956(a)  acts of violence against
Israelis and others to
facilitate the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad’s goal of
removing Israel from land
claimed by Palestinians
 Al-Arian,
Ballut,
Hammoudeh,
Fariz, were
acquitted by a
jury
 The charge
remains
pending against
absentee
defendants
Shallah, Awda,
al-Khatib, Nafi
and al-Najjar.
n/a
United States
v. Sattar
02-cr-395
(S.D.N.Y.)
 Ahmed
Abdel Sattar
§ 956(a)  acts of violence against
Israelis, Americans, and
others in furtherance of the
goals of the Egyptian Islamic
Group
 convicted by
jury
 pending
United States
v. Hassoun
04-cr-60001
(S.D. Fla.)
 Adham
Amin
Hassoun
§ 956(a)  “It was a purpose and
object of the conspiracy to
advance violent jihad,
including supporting, and
 pending n/a
161 Ali Mohamad pled guilty to a variety of charges in connection with the East African Embassy bombings
in October 2000. See Docket Report Entry Oct. 20, 2000 (on file with author). There is nothing in the
docket indicating that he has yet been sentenced, however.
162 The indictment in this case merely cites 18 U.S.C. § 956, without specifying subsection (a) or (b). See
United States v. Ahmad, No. 04-cr-301 (D. Conn.) (indictment), at 11 (on file with author). The details of
the indictment’s allegations sound in § 956(a) rather than § 956(b), however, and the affidavit submitted by
DOJ in support of a request to extradite Ahmad from the United Kingdom speaks exclusively of homicide,
not property destruction. See United States v. Ahmad (Affidavit of Robert Appleton, in Support of Request
for Extradition of Babar Ahmed), 36-37, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ct/Documents/AHMAD%20extradition%20affidavit.pdf.
163 Appleton Affidavit, supra note 162, at 37.
49
 Mohamed
Hesham
Youssef
 Kifah Wael
Jayyousi
 Kassem
Daher
 Jose Padilla
participating in, armed
confrontations in specific
locations outside the United
States, and committing acts
of murder, kidnapping, and
maiming, for the purpose of
opposing existing
governments and civilian
factions and establishing
Islamic states under
Sharia.”164
3. Examining the Boundaries of Conspiracy Liability
Five of the six cases described in Table 7 allege an agreement to use violence
against persons outside the United States without any attempt on the part of prosecutors
to prove that the agreement was particularized as to the individuals to be harmed, where
the harm might occur, when the harm might occur, or how the harm might be inflicted.165
But these cases do more than reinforce the basic applicability of the general rules to § 956,
however. They also raise an important question about the outer boundaries of conspiracy
liability in circumstances that arguably are distinct from the core scenario embodied in
cases such as Salameh. Specifically, they raise the question whether some variation of
the “wheel” model of conspiracy liability might be applied to the entire global jihad
movement, or at least to some portions thereof, in order to make it possible to prosecute
an individual for conspiring to kill people overseas based on proof that the defendant
provided various kinds of support to the movement.
United States v. bin Laden, a pre-9/11 case, gave an early indication of the
potential breadth of conspiracy liability under § 956(a). To be sure, the charge in that
case was firmly grounded in a very specific act of violence: the murder of U.S. nationals
164 United States v. Hassoun, No. 04-cr-60001 (S.D. Fla.) (superseding indictment) (Nov. 17, 2005) ¶ 13
(on file with author).
165 The sole exception – United States v. Wharton – happens not to be a terrorism case at all, nor even a
prevention scenario, but instead simply a run-of-the-mill murder-for-hire scenario in which the defendant
happened to arrange for the hit to take place in Haiti rather than in the United States. See United States v.
Wharton, 320 F.3d 526, 529-31 (5th Cir. 2003).
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in the 1998 East African Embassy bombings. And the defendants who went to trial in
that case were personally involved in that particular attack. In that respect, the bin Laden
indictment did not even require application of the general rule relating to agreement
specificity. But a close look at the indictment’s description of the objectives of the §
956(a) agreement shows that they were not limited to those particular bombings, nor –
and this is the critical distinction – were they limited to acts in which these defendants
might themselves be personally involved. On the contrary, the indictment alleged a range
of more-generalized objectives associated with al Qaeda’s violent agenda (in addition to
those relating to the embassy bombings), culminating in the allegation that the
conspiracy’s objectives included the killing “United States civilians anywhere in the
world.”166
Even this broad charge was relatively uncontroversial, however, given the
personal involvement of the defendants in the East African embassy bombings. In
contrast, the four other § 956(a) prosecutions in terrorism-related cases in Table 7 (all
post-dating 9/11) depend entirely, or least in significant part, on allegations that link the
defendants only indirectly to the violent objective.
a. Conspiracy Liability via Participation in an FTO?
In two of these four cases, the link between the defendants and the violent
objective of the alleged § 956(a) agreement is provided by their activities in support of an
FTO. In United States v. Sattar, for example, defendant Ahmed Abdel Sattar was
charged with violating § 956(a) in connection with the violent activities of the Egyptian
Islamic Group (“EIG”).167 The indictment did not allege that Sattar was personally
166 Bin Laden, supra note 160, ¶ 15.
167 United States v. Sattar, 02-cr-395 (S.D.N.Y.) (superseding indictment) (on file with author).
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involved in any act of violence or anticipated violence, nor that he intended the
commission of any particular act of violence in the future. Instead, it alleged that Sattar
had acted as an intermediary in communications between imprisoned EIG leader Omar
Abdel Rahman and EIG leadership in Egypt. It also alleged, however, that other EIG
members had committed violent acts overseas in the past and intended to do so again in
the future, and that Sattar in effect had agreed to the fulfillment of these violent
objectives.168
The theory of liability at work in Sattar thus might be characterized as follows.
EIG itself is the embodiment of an ongoing agreement among numerous individuals –
many of whom have no direct contact with one another – to commit various violent
crimes. Some participants are operatives who have engaged or will engage in carrying
out violent acts. Others provide leadership. Still others serve various and sundry related
purposes, such as Sattar’s role in facilitating communications among leadership figures.
But all intend to assist the organization in realizing its overarching goals, including the
commission of violent acts.169
Under the general rules, this is not an implausible analysis. Indeed, it resembles
the sort of conspiracy charge that might be brought in connection with a sprawling
narcotics operation. In both cases, a particular defendant may be unaware of the identity
and specific activities of other persons involved in the overall enterprise, but nonetheless
may be said to have conspired with these individuals insofar as they knew or should have
168 See id.
169 When viewed in this light, the theory of conspiracy liability at issue in cases such as Sattar sounds very
much like conspiracy liability under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act of 1970, better
known as “RICO.” There have been a handful of cases in which RICO conspiracy charges have been
brought alongside of other charges in terrorism conspiracy cases, though in the one such case to go to trial
thusfar, the defendants were acquitted. See, e.g., United States v. al-Arian, 02-cr-77 (M.D. Fla.) (docket
report) (on file with author).
52
known that such persons and activities were necessary to the achievement of the entity’s
purposes. The intermediating role of EIG actually enhances the possibility of finding
Sattar to be part of a violent conspiracy, in comparison to a relatively amorphous
narcotics network, in that it provides a relatively-formal structure to knit together the
intentions and actions of the individuals allegedly involved. Combined with the premises
that one need only know the “essential purposes” of the agreement and that the agreement
itself need not be specific beyond the nature of the offense to be committed, these
considerations suggest that the reach of conspiracy liability extends beyond the core
scenario associated with Salameh.
The district court in Sattar appears to have agreed, at least implicitly. Variations
of this issue actually were litigated in the case at least twice. The first occasion involved
a challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment, with one defendant contending that the
indictment was “defective because it alleges” a conspiracy to murder in violation of §
956(a) “without identifying the ‘persons’ or ‘foreign country’ with any specificity.”170
The government responded that it was not obliged to plead or prove such details, and
added that it in fact had no intention of trying to prove such details at trial.171 The court
accepted this view. Citing Salameh as indirect support, it held that “§ 956(a) does not
require that an indictment allege the identities of contemplated victims or the specific
location outside the United States where the contemplated killing, kidnapping, or
maiming is to occur. . . . Nor are these specific facts an essential element of the crime
charged.”172 The court did not also address the question of whether it was appropriate to
170 United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp.2d 279, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
171 Id. at 304 (citing Oral Argument Transcript 39).
172 Id. at 304.
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treat the activities of EIG as a single, ongoing conspiracy of which Sattar was a part,
though its conclusion implicitly rejects any objection on that score.
Because that aspect of the decision in Sattar addressed only the sufficiency of the
indictment, the possibility remained that the Court might nonetheless be persuaded that
the government must prove Sattar’s knowledge of and assent to such details at trial. But
in the same opinion, the court foreclosed that possibility in the course of rejecting a
request for a bill of particulars. “[T]he Government is not required . . .,” the court wrote,
“to prove that any specific persons were killed or kidnapped.”173 The court reaffirmed
this holding, moreover, in the face of a post-conviction challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting Sattar’s conviction.174 The Sattar decisions thus expressly applied
the general rules regarding agreement specificity, while at the same time implicitly
endorsing the extension of that approach to a model in which EIG as a whole is treated as
a single conspiracy.175
To say that a person associated with an FTO might plausibly be prosecuted for
conspiring to commit the violent acts that constitute the group’s goals, even though not
directly involved in planning or executing such acts, is not to say that all such persons
necessarily will be convicted on those grounds, however. The more remote the defendant
is from the group’s violent activities, the more difficult it becomes to prove that the
defendant specifically intended those activities to occur. In Sattar’s case, the jury was
persuaded of his guilt, and he was duly convicted. But in the closely-analogous
173 Id. at 318.
174 United States v. Sattar, 395 F. Supp.2d 79, 98-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
175 The trial judge in United States v. al-Arian appeared to reach a similar conclusion, rejecting a motion to
dismiss the § 956(a) charge in that case (premised on the homicidal activities of the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (“PIJ”)) with little comment. See United States v. al-Arian, 308 F. Supp.2d 1322, 1350 (M.D. Fla.
2004).
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prosecution of Sami al-Arian and other defendants for their alleged role in providing
fundraising and other logistical support in the United States to Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(“PIJ”) – on a theory of indirect liability just like that in Sattar – the jury acquitted those
defendants who went to trial on the § 956(a) charge.176
b. Conspiracy Liability via Participation in the Global Jihad
Movement?
Does conspiracy liability of this indirect variety also apply in the unaffiliated
terrorism scenario? Up to a point, the answer surely is yes. It is not the fact that an FTO
has been formally-designated as such that makes it persuasive to describe a participant in
its affairs as being part of a broad conspiracy to carry out the group’s violent agenda, but
rather the evidence of the defendant’s intentions and understanding regarding that agenda.
Status as an FTO matters in this context only insofar as the label is a proxy for the notion
that the entity in issue is relatively organized and hence that it will be relatively easy as a
result for prosecutors to demonstrate the nature and scope of the defendant’s intentions.
Lacking that advantage is not necessarily fatal, however. Even if the defendant is linked
to some group or network that has not been formally designated, the available evidence
nonetheless may support a finding of participation in a broad, wheel-type conspiracy.
That said, concerns about the scope of conspiracy liability are heightened once
one moves beyond the FTO scenario, and particularly where the indirect relationships
through which a defendant is linked to violent conduct are defined with reference to the
global jihad movement. As described above, the movement is not monolithic. It is, at
best, a convenient label for referring collectively to a constellation of groups, networks,
and individuals operating in an array of states over many years. Participants in the
176 Docket Report, supra note 169.
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movement share an ideo-theological perspective on the propriety of using force to
achieve certain goals, but beyond that may be highly disparate. It is convenient, but not
accurate, to objectify the movement as such into a sort of all-encompassing uber-FTO.
The two remaining § 956 prosecutions mentioned in Table 7 both arise against the
backdrop of these concerns. In United States v. Ahmad, for example, a British citizen has
been charged with violating § 956(a) in connection with his conduct in creating a set of
websites through which he allegedly engaged in fundraising and incitement to violence in
support of the global jihad movement in general, including manifestations of that
movement in Afghanistan and Chechnya. The indictment frames the case broadly,
stating by way of introduction that “fundamentalist Muslim groups” use the term jihad to
“refer[] to the use of violence . . . against persons or governments that are deemed to be
enemies of its proponents,” and that “armed conflicts in the geographic areas of Bosnia,
Chechnya, Afghanistan and elsewhere” carried on by such groups in the name of jihad
“have involved murder, maiming, kidnapping, and the destruction of property.” 177
Ahmad’s activities at times are specifically alleged to have been for the benefit of the
Taliban – making the indictment partially akin to the FTO-oriented § 956(a) charges at
issue in Sattar and al-Arian – but at other times are alleged to have been directed toward
the benefit of the broader jihad movement, particularly as it manifested in Chechnya.178
177 Ahmad Indictment, supra note 162, at ¶ 6.
178 An affidavit filed by DOJ in support of an extradition request for Ahmad summarizes the basis for the §
956(a) charge as follows: “AHMAD engaged in his efforts with an understanding that it was in support of
the murder of the enemies of the Taliban and Chechen Mujahideen. . . . AHMAD’s participation in this
agreement, and his understanding of the goals of these terrorist organizations, is confirmed through the
evidence obtained from AHMAD’s residence and work space. . . . Further, AHMAD possessed classified
U.S. Naval information and a document which discussed the vulnerabilities of the Naval battle group to an
attack.” Appleton Affidavit, supra note 162, at 37.
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United States v. Hassoun, a once-obscure case that grabbed headlines when it
became the vehicle for the civilian prosecution of Jose Padilla, 179 is framed in similar
terms. The civilian criminal charges against Padilla do not turn on the dramatic
allegations – involving plots to detonate a dirty bomb or to set off natural gas explosions
in high-rise apartment buildings – that were publicized during the course of his military
detention.180 Indeed, the indictment does not actually allege that Padilla or his co-
defendants were involved with al Qaeda as such, nor with any particular violent plots.
Instead, the co-defendants are depicted as being a “support cell” for the global jihad
movement in general, engaging in recruiting and other logistical support activities, and
Padilla himself is described as one of their recruits.
As in Ahmad, the indictment in Hassoun begins with an evocation of the global
jihad movement: “There existed a radical Islamic fundamentalist movement dedicated to
the establishment of a pure Islamic state . . . governed by strict Islamic law . . . .
Followers and supporters of this movement adhered to a radical Salafist ideology that
encouraged and promoted ‘violent jihad.’”181 According to the definition offered in the
indictment, “violent jihad” includes “planning for, preparing for, and engaging in, acts of
physical violence, including murder, maiming, kidnapping, and hostage-taking.”182 The
indictment notes that al Qaeda and a number of other groups espouse this view and carry
179 Padilla had been held for a number of years as a military detainee on the ground that he was an al Qaeda
operative dispatched to the U.S. to carry out terrorist attacks. The legality of his detention recently had
been upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, though on the distinct ground that Padilla allegedly
had carried arms for al Qaeda in Afghanistan at the time of the U.S. invasion in fall 2001. See Padilla v.
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). While Padilla’s petition for certiorari was pending in the Supreme
Court, however, the government moved to transfer Padilla back to civilian custody for prosecution as a co-
defendant in Hassoun. See Yin, supra note 22.
180 See Remarks of Deputy Attorney General James Comey Regarding Jose Padilla (June 1, 2004)
(describing allegations), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2004/dag6104.htm.
181 United States v. Hassoun, 04-cr-60001 (S.D. Fla.) (superseding indictment) (Nov. 17, 2005), ¶¶ 1-5.
182 Id.
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out violent acts in pursuit of it, but it does not allege that the defendants’ conduct was
limited to any one such group. Rather, it alleges that the “defendants . . . operated and
participated in a North American support cell that sent money, physical assets, and
mujahideen recruits to overseas conflicts for the purpose of fighting violent jihad. This
North American support cell supported and coordinated with other support networks and
mujahideen groups waging violent jihad.183
This description of the global jihad movement has the virtue of accurately
distinguishing between al Qaeda itself and the broader movement of which it and other
groups are a part, and also of reflecting the related reality that the organizational
affiliations of some participants in that movement are not limited to one specific group or
even identifiable at all. But this virtue has the potential to be a vice insofar as the scope
of conspiracy liability is concerned. It runs the risk of portraying the entire movement as
one giant agreement to commit murder and mayhem, making every single adherent
around the world a potential § 956(a) conspirator.
Post-indictment developments in Hassoun have shown this concern to be well-
founded. In the late spring of 2006, defendant Adham Amin Hassoun moved for a bill of
particulars with respect to the § 956(a) charge against him, among other things. Arguing
that he “cannot defend against” the § 956(a) charge “without knowing who were the
actual or intended victims of the alleged conspiracy,”184 Hassoun requested information
including the “time, place, and nature of all acts of murder, kidnapping, or maiming
which were committed, or which were intended or planned to be committed, as part of
183 Id.
184 Id. at 27.
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the conspiracy” and the “name of all persons who were the actual or intended victims.”185
Eventually, this request came before the court for oral argument, at which time
prosecutors offered to identify broad categories of victims, though in keeping with the
general rules they did not offer to identify specific individuals. The court incorporated
this offer into an order partially granting Hassoun’s motion, 186 and the government
subsequently provided the following “clarification”:
[T]he defendants herein were part of a larger radical Islamic fundamentalist
movement that waged “violent jihad” by opposing governments, institutions, and
individuals that did not share their view of Islam or their goal of reestablishing a
Caliphate. As it pertains to this case, these defendants supported violence,
including murder, maimings and kidnappings, committed by mujahideen groups
operating in various jihad theaters around the world. Specifically, the violent
Islamist groups in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan,
Tajikistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and Lebanon.
In some of these theaters, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya, and
Tajikistan their violence was directed mainly towards existing central government
regimes they believed were oppressing Muslims and resisting the establishment of
strict Islamic states. Therefore, they engaged in armed confrontations, including
murders, maiming, and kidnappings, against Serbian and Croat forces in Bosnia,
Russian forces in Chechnya and Tajikistan, and opposing Muslim forces in
Afghanistan during the civil strife that ensued after the Russian forces withdrew
in 1989. In other theaters such as Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Somalia, and Tunisia,
they supported the violent Islamist groups and factions committing acts of murder,
maiming, and kidnapping against leaders, members, and supporters of what they
viewed as apostate regimes, including other Muslims.187
This “clarification” of the indictment demonstrates that the § 956(a) charge in
Hassoun rests at least in part on the proposition that the global jihad movement is a single
overarching agreement involving the use of violence by a vast array of groups and
individuals around the world, in furtherance of a revolutionary political agenda with both
185 United States v. Hassoun, 04-cr-60001 (S.D. Fla.) (“Defendant Hassoun’s Motion for Bill of Particulars
and Incorporated Memorandum of Law”) (Feb. 13, 2006), at 3 (on file with author).
186 Id. (italics added).
187 Letter from Russell R. Killinger, Assistant United States Attorney, to Kenneth Schwartz and Jeanne
Baker (July 7, 2006) at 1-2, attached to United States v. Hassoun, 04-cr-60001, Defendant Hassoun’s
Motion for Clarification of Court’s Ruling as to What Government Must Particularize Regarding the
“Manner and Means” of the Conspiracy (July 25, 2006) (on file with author).
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global and parochial goals. Notwithstanding the ample scope of liability provided by the
general rules, this approach overstates the bounds of conspiracy liability. And it does so
unnecessarily.
The problem is not that Padilla and his co-defendants cannot properly be
prosecuted under § 956(a). They can be, on a more narrowly-conceived understanding of
the scope of their intentions and agreements. As noted above, wheel-type conspiracies
can be defined in very broad terms, enabling prosecutors to establish a common
agreement among individuals who may not be directly related. If a jury can be persuaded
that these defendants mutually agreed to engage in conduct that they intended would
produce violent acts overseas, they are liable notwithstanding the lack of evidence
showing that they intended to support a particular FTO or cause a particular attack to
occur. But it is important that the court police against the prospect of an unbounded
definition of the agreement that would bring within its scope quite literally the entire
swath of conduct associated with the global jihad movement.
In the final analysis the outer boundaries of conspiracy liability remain
necessarily indeterminate, as they ultimately turn on the particulars of what specific
individuals intended and agreed to accomplish. It is clear, however, that conspiracy
charges have a tremendous capacity to support anticipatory prosecution. Prosecutors
need not show that the agreement in issue has evolved beyond the point of specifying a
type of offense, and may cast a broad net in identifying the persons whose illicit
intentions and grasp of the essential nature of the agreement’s objectives make them
parties to it. But that broad net must have limits. Unaffiliated terrorism prosecutions
premised on a defendant’s involvement with the global jihad movement, defined
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artificially in quasi-organizational terms, pose a particular threat in that regard. Courts
must proceed with caution when considering the viability of such charges, their
evidentiary and other collateral consequences, and the jury instructions that they require,
lest the floodgates open to an essentially uncabined form of conspiracy liability.
Taking a cautious approach with the scope of conspiracy statutes such as § 956(a)
in any event will not unduly hamper the government’s anticipatory prosecution options.
Quite apart from the fact that conspiracy liability would still be quite capable of
providing grounds for prosecuting those who collaborate with others while intending to
cause violent acts to occur, conspiracy charges are not the only alternative available to
prosecutors in the terrorism scenario, unaffiliated or otherwise. Indeed, conspiracy
charges are not even the most capacious option. That honor goes instead to 18 U.S.C. §
2339A, the subject of the next section.
IV. Section 2339A and the Scope of Anticipatory Prosecution
Section 2339A, like its close cousin § 2339B, is a statute that prohibits the
provision of “material support or resources” in certain circumstances. But unlike the
FTO-oriented § 2339B, § 2339A does not turn in any way on the identity of the recipient.
Perhaps for this reason, § 2339A charges have been common in unaffiliated terrorism
cases since 9/11, more so than conspiracy charges under § 956 and comparable statutes.
One cannot appreciate the full extent of the government’s anticipatory prosecution power
without understanding the utility of § 2339A for that purpose.
A. An Overview of § 2339A and Its Use Since 9/11
Section 2339A states:
“Whoever provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the
nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing
61
or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a
violation of . . . [any of 46 separate predicate crimes] . . . or in preparation for, or
in carrying out, the concealment of an escape from the commission of any such
violation, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results,
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.”188
With only a few arguable exceptions, the 46 predicate offenses upon which §
2339A liability depends are not necessarily terrorism crimes.189 They certainly describe
conduct that might be characterized as terrorism depending upon the perpetrator’s
motivations, however. As detailed in Appendix A, the predicate offenses cover conduct
ranging from the manufacture, possession, or transfer of weapons of mass destruction to
the use of violence against various categories of persons and properties both within the
United States and abroad, and even include certain computer hacking offenses. 190 The
list of predicates does not include the general federal conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371),
but it should be noted that a full 35 of the 46 offenses provide for conspiracy liability in
their own right. Indeed, one of them – the ubiquitous § 956 – provides for liability only
on that basis.191
A close review of charging patterns in post-9/11 terrorism prosecutions makes
clear that prosecutors have frequently relied on § 2339A and have met with considerable
success in doing so. Appendix B reports the results of a survey of all § 2339A
prosecutions initiated during the three-year period from September 2001 through
September 2004. 192 During that period, § 2339A was charged a total of 46 times
(including attempts and conspiracies to violate § 2339, as well as “completed” violations)
188 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
189 See id.
190 See Appendix A.
191 This would seem to preclude any argument that Congress did not intend § 2339A to be used in
connection with conspiracy-based violations of the predicate offenses.
192 This data set has not previously been published.
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against 23 individual defendants in 14 separate cases.193 Not surprisingly, the charge has
been particularly important in cases where there does not appear to be an FTO link that
would support a § 2339B charge; of the 23 defendants charged with one or more
violations of § 2339A, only 6 (from 5 separate cases) simultaneously were charged with a
§ 2339B, FTO-based violation.194
These § 2339A prosecutions are divided roughly equally between activity directed
toward terrorism in the United States and terrorism abroad, as measured by the nature of
the predicate offenses at issue. Section 956 has been a predicate offense for 27 counts
involving 18 individual defendants. On the other hand, § 2332b (criminalizing violent
acts in the U.S. involving an element of transnational planning) has been the predicate for
10 counts against 8 individuals, and § 2332a (criminalizing the use or threatened use of
weapons of mass destruction, broadly understood, against U.S. persons or within the
U.S.) has been the predicate for 16 counts against 3 individuals. Only three other statutes
have served as § 2339A predicates in these cases, including one instance of § 32
(destruction of aircraft), two counts relating to § 844 (explosives), and one count relating
to § 1114 (murder of U.S. employees).195 Tables 2 and 3 summarize:
193 See Appendix B, infra.
194 Defendants al-Hussayen, Arnaout, Abdi, Royer, Kahn, and Mustafa are the only defendants who faced
simultaneous § 2339A and § 2339B charges. A seventh defendant – Stewart – faced the charges in
sequence rather than simultaneously. See Sattar, 314 F. Supp.2d 279 (discussing dismissal of original §
2339B charge and subsequent addition of a § 2339A charge).
195 It should be noted that § 2339A charges were predicated on more than one offense in connection with
eight of the defendants. The most common combination of predicate offenses – applicable to eight §
2339A charges against six defendants – was § 956 paired with § 2332b.
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Table 2
§ 2339A Predicate Offenses 9/01-9/04 (by count)
Table 3
§ 2339A Predicate Offenses 9/01-9/04 (by individual defendant)
Although 25 charges against six individuals remain pending, disposition
information is available for the bulk of these defendants. Five counts against four
individual defendants resulted in jury acquittals, and one charge against one defendant
was dropped on the government’s own motion. Plea agreements have led to the dismissal
of three charges against three defendants, but also to convictions on two charges for one
defendant. Five individuals have been convicted by a jury on a total of seven counts,196
with three other individuals convicted on three counts during a bench trial. Only 4
196 This figure includes two defendants whose convictions subsequently were vacated on the government’s
own motion upon revelations of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v. Koubriti, 336 F.
Supp.2d 676 (E.D. Mich. 2004). One reasonably could include them instead under the heading of dropped
charges, or else exclude them altogether from the discussion.
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individuals have been sentenced at the time of this writing, however, with three receiving
the maximum sentence of 180 months and one sentenced to a relatively forgiving 97
month term. Table 4 illustrates the disposition data on a per-count basis.
Table 4
§ 2339A Charge Disposition 9/01-9/04 (by individual count)
This data makes clear that § 2339A is charged frequently and with at least some
degree of success. And yet up to this point it has received relatively little attention from
scholars, who have tended to focus instead on § 2339B and FTO-oriented prosecutions.197
This very likely reflects a perception that § 2339A prosecutions raise no significant issues
in light of the fact that the statute requires proof of knowledge or intent linking the
support to the commission of a specific predicate offense, whereas § 2339B and § 1705
impose a form of strict liability on those who would provide aid to FTOs. If so, however,
that is a mistaken impression. Section 2339A, as it has actually been charged in recent
years, raises important and difficult questions about the scope of the government’s
anticipatory prosecution power.
197 My own prior work on terrorism prosecutions exhibits this fault. See, e.g., Chesney, Sleeper Scenario,
supra note 7 (focusing primarily on FTO-support prosecutions).
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B. The Utility of § 2339A for Prevention
A close review of how § 2339A has been charged in recent cases suggests that the
statute may indeed impose criminal liability in circumstances that otherwise might
exceed the reach of federal law, including even conspiracy liability. This makes § 2339A
a particularly important tool for prosecutors tasked with intervening at the earliest
possible opportunity in cases potentially involving terrorism, though at the same time it
raises concerns as to whether § 2339A strikes an appropriate balance between the
benefits of prevention and offsetting harms such as a potentially-increased rate of false
positives.
Section 2339A’s broad scope follows from the interaction of several features of
the statute. First, the statute applies without respect to whether the predicate offense
actually occurs; so long as the defendant provided support with the intent (or knowledge)
that the support would be used for a predicate offense, liability attaches immediately. In
this abstract respect, § 2339A liability is akin to conspiracy liability, which also attaches
independent of whether the predicate offense is even attempted, let alone completed. But
§ 2339A is broader than conspiracy liability in several respects. Most obviously,
prosecutors need not prove an agreement with anyone, as the actus reus consists entirely
in the provision of material support. In addition, whereas the object of a conspiracy must
be the commission of an unlawful act, the “object” of support given in violation of §
2339A may either be the commission of a predicate offense or conduct merely
constituting “preparation for” commission of such an offense. That subtle distinction,
which is express in the text of § 2339A, has the practical effect of expanding the range of
conduct that would count as a predicate offense, reaching beyond the offenses themselves
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to encompass anticipatory activity intended to culminate in offense conduct. Thus one
might describe § 2339A as prohibiting the provision of support with intent to facilitate
either a violation of a predicate statute or activity preliminary to such a violation.
Complicating matters, the list of predicate offenses under § 2339A includes
numerous conspiracy-capable provisions. Thus it is a crime not only to provide support
with knowledge or the intent that it will facilitate the commission of certain violent acts,
but also to do so knowing or intending that it will facilitate the formation of various
conspiratorial agreements. In this aspect, § 2339A might be characterized in terms of
aiding-and-abetting a conspiracy.198
A final factor that contributes to the preventive capacity of § 2339A arises from
the definition of “material support.” As noted previously, that definition is surpassingly
broad. Most notable for present purposes, however, is the fact that it includes the
provision of one’s own self as “personnel.” Thus one might violate § 2339A by
providing one’s self as personnel to others (whether an FTO or not) with the goal of
assisting in commission of, or preparation for the commission of, a predicate offense
(including an offense in the nature of a conspiracy). This proposition has important
implications for the capacity of the government to intervene in cases involving potential
terrorists.
C. The Spectrum of § 2339A Applications
A close review of the fact patterns underlying recent § 2339A prosecutions
suggests that prosecutors are well aware of the expansive capacity for early intervention
that § 2339A provides in light of these factors.
198 As Norm Abrams has observed, § 2339A thus resembles an accomplice liability, or aiding-and-abetting,
provision. See Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from the
(Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL. 5, 10-11 (2005).
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These cases can be grouped into three fact-pattern categories, depending on the
strength of the nexus among the defendant’s conduct, the defendant’s intentions, and the
nature of the anticipated harm upon which the charge ultimately is predicated. Some of
the cases, for example, involve a relatively tight nexus between the defendant and the
harm to be averted, as indicated by the defendant’s awareness of the specific harmful
conduct that the support will facilitate (the “close-nexus scenario”). The second category
is a grey area in which there are glimmers of specificity regarding the predicate offense to
be facilitated, but also a sense in which the defendant’s aim is to provide support at a
generalized level (the “intermediate-nexus scenario”). In the third and most challenging
category, there are no such elements of specificity or direct involvement (the “open-
nexus scenario”). Under that heading we find the broadest assertions of liability, and the
cases that present the most difficult issues in terms of reconciling the costs and benefits
of preventive prosecution.
1. Category 1 – The Close-Nexus Scenario
It is possible for a § 2339A prosecution to be attempted in circumstances in which
there is a clear and close connection among the defendant’s conduct and intentions and
the anticipated harm reflected in the underlying predicate offense. United States v.
Nettles provides a paradigmatic example.
Gale Nettles was serving time in connection with a counterfeiting conviction
when he indicated to a fellow inmate that he was interested in bombing the federal
courthouse in Chicago. 199 The FBI learned of this, and after Nettles was released,
arranged a sting operation. Using contact information provided to him by a jailhouse
199 The description in this paragraph derives both from the indictment in United States v. Nettles, 04-cr-699
(N.D. Ill.) (on file with author), and Matt O’Connor & Glenn Jeffers, FBI Aids Suspect in Catching Himself,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2004, at 1.
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cooperator, Nettles contacted an undercover agent who posed as a farmer willing to sell a
large amount of ammonium nitrate (which Nettles planned to mix with fuel oil in order to
create a bomb along the lines of that used in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing). Nettles
also solicited help from another undercover agent whom he believed to be associated
either with al Qaeda or Hamas. After acquiring a large amount of what he believed to be
ammonium nitrate from the “farmer,” Nettles then sold a portion of the material to the
“terrorist representative.” Nettles ultimately was prosecuted on a variety of charges,
including two counts relating to attempts to use explosives to destroy a building (18
U.S.C. § 844(f) (attacking a federal building with explosives) and § 844(i) (attacking a
building used in interstate commerce with explosives)) and also a number of counts
relating to his counterfeiting activities. In addition, prosecutors also charged him with
violating § 2339A on the theory that when he sold the “ammonium nitrate” to the
“terrorist representative,” he thereby attempted to provide material support with the intent
to assist the commission of both the aforementioned explosives offenses as well as a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (addressing homicide of U.S. employees).200 Ultimately,
the jury convicted Nettles on the explosives and counterfeiting charges. He was acquitted
on the § 2339A count, however, indicating that the jurors may have been uncomfortable
with the aspect of the operation in which the FBI supplied an undercover agent to pose as
a representative of a terrorist organization.
The mixed verdict in Nettles suggests that the § 2339A count against him
ultimately was superfluous in light of the weightier and more direct charges that he faced.
In close-nexus cases, this often if not always will be the case. As the nexus among
intentions, conduct, and anticipated harm becomes looser, however, the prospect for a
200 See O’Connor & Jeffers, supra note 199.
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conviction on a charge deriving directly from the anticipated harm decreases, and the
need to rely instead on § 2339A (or else forego prosecution) grows correspondingly.
2. Category 2 – The Intermediate-Nexus Scenario
Few if any other § 2339A prosecutions compare to Nettles insofar as the nexus
among conduct, intent, and anticipated harm are concerned. But the extent to which the
other cases depart from the close-nexus scenario varies considerably.
Some of the cases may be grouped together in an intermediate category that still
involves considerable potential overlap with other forms of liability, including in
particular conspiracy liability. Under this heading, it is relatively clear to the § 2339A
defendant that a particular type of violent act or offense will occur, but the defendant is
not personally involved in the offense other than via the rendering of support, and may be
unaware of the particulars of how, when, or by whom the offense will be executed. Such
circumstances would not necessarily preclude a conspiracy prosecution in light of the
standards described in the previous section, and thus the need for the § 2339A charge
from the prosecutor’s perspective remains relatively low, though stronger than in the
close nexus scenario. On the other hand, where the circumstances are such that the only
available inchoate crime charge would involve attempt rather than conspiracy, the
relative need for the § 2339A charge is much higher.
United States v. Babar arguably provides an example of § 2339A liability
overlapping with conspiracy liability in the intermediate-nexus scenario.201 Mohammed
Junaid Babar, a Pakistani-American, established and operated a training camp in a remote
area near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in 2004, providing instruction in a variety of
military-type skills to would-be jihadists. But his conduct was not limited to supporting
201 United States v. Babar, 04-cr-528 (S.D.N.Y.) (docket report) (on file with author).
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potential violence in this general sense. As he admitted at his plea allocution, he also
supplied aluminum powder to certain individuals who had attended his camp, and had
attempted to acquire ammonium nitrate for them as well, while understanding that the
men intended to use these bomb ingredients “for a plot somewhere in the U.K.”202 Under
the rules relating to agreement specificity described above, this would seem to have made
Babar eligible for prosecution under § 956(a), not just under § 2339A.
Conspiracy liability will not always be available in the intermediate-nexus
scenario, however, and where it is not the utility of § 2339A becomes more apparent.
Consider United States v. Lakhani. That case arose out of a sting operation against an
arms dealer who believed that he was supplying a surface-to-air missile (“SAM”) to a
representative of a foreign terrorist organization. The undercover agent posing as that
representative made clear to the defendant that his intention was to use the SAM to shoot
down a commercial jet in the United States. Lakhani thus was an intermediate-nexus
case, in that the defendant was aware of the type of offense to be committed with the
assistance of his support but was not planning to be involved personally in the offense
and was unaware of when or where the attack would happen or who in particular would
execute it.
Lakhani ultimately was charged and convicted under § 2339A, though the case
has generated criticisms from an entrapment perspective.203 Had he been working with
an actual terrorist rather than an undercover agent, prosecutors might well have pursued a
conspiracy charged predicated on violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 32 and 2332b, rather than or
202 Jonathan Wald, N.Y. Man Admits He Aided al Qaeda, Set Up Jihad Camp, CNN.COM, Aug. 11, 2004,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/11/ny.terror.suspect/.
203 See, e.g., The Arms Trader, THIS AMERICAN LIFE, WBEZ RADIO, July 8, 2005 (suggesting that Lakhani
was a harmless individual entrapped by the government) (recording on file with author).
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in addition to the § 2339A approach it actually took. One cannot unilaterally conspire
with a person who is in fact an undercover agent with no intent to carry out the purported
agreement’s objective, however.204 Accordingly, as was the case in Nettles, the relevant
inchoate offense would arise instead under the heading of attempt. But whereas it was
possible to convict Nettles of attempt in light of the close-nexus fact pattern in that case,
an attempt charge would have been difficult to prove in the intermediate-nexus scenario
involving Lakhani. In this sense, the § 2339A charge provided an option in Lakhani that
prosecutors might otherwise have lacked.205
3. Category 3 – The Open-Nexus Scenario
In the fact patterns described above, the defendant has some direct connection to
those who will actually perpetrate the anticipated harm, coupled with an awareness at
least of the nature of the harm and the manner in which the support rendered would be
employed toward that end. A number of § 2339A prosecutions lack these characteristics,
however. In these “open-nexus” fact patterns, the defendant has only an attenuated
relationship to the anticipated harmful act.
Six of the fourteen § 2339A cases included in Appendix B arguably fit this
description.206 In these cases, the alleged support typically consists of either fundraising,
recruiting of personnel, or the establishment of training facilities, all directed in a general
way toward assisting the activities of either an FTO or the global jihad movement rather
than in connection with a more specific plot to carry out any particular offense.
204 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 740 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Lively, 803 F.2d
1124, 1126 (11th Cir. 1986); Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1965).
205 Lakhani would not have walked free if not for the § 2339A charge. His conduct separately exposed
him to money laundering and arms-importation charges, and he was convicted on these as well. See United
States v. Lakhani, Judgment in a Criminal Case (on file with author).
206 The six cases I have in mind are United States v. Hassoun, United States v. al-Hussayen, United States v.
Arnaout, United States v. Sattar, United States v. Abdi, and United States v. Mustafa.
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In United States v. Arnaout, for example, prosecutors alleged that Enaam Arnaout
– a naturalized American citizen who since 1993 had been the Chief Executive Officer of
a charity known as the Benevolence International Foundation (“BIF”) – had fraudulently
diverted BIF funds in order to provide weapons, supplies, and funding for a wide range of
“groups and organizations engaged in violent activities, including al Qaeda, Hezb e
Islami, and persons engaged in violent confrontations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya,
and their neighboring regions” 207 (i.e., to various manifestations of the global jihad
movement). Similarly, the § 2339A charges against the defendant in United States v.
Mustafa (a London-based cleric known as Abu Hamza) stem from his role in attempting
to establish a “jihad training camp” in Oregon and “facilitating violent jihad in
Afghanistan” by assisting others in their attempts to reach training facilities there.208 In
another case, Nuradin Abdi is charged with violating § 2339A by, apparently, providing
himself as personnel, based at least in part on allegations that he traveled to Ethiopia “for
the purpose of obtaining military-style training in preparation for violent Jihad.”209 In
United States v. Sattar, defendants Lynne Stewart and Mohammed Yousry were
convicted under § 2339A in connection with their conduct in enabling Omar Abdel
Rahman, the imprisoned EIG leader, to communicate to EIG members his decision to
withdraw support for the group’s “ceasefire” with the Egyptian government.210 In United
States v. al-Hussayen, defendant Sami Omar al-Hussayen ultimately was acquitted on
207 United States v. Arnaout, No. 02-cr-892 (E.D. Ill.) (indictment) ¶ 7 (on file with author).
208 United States v. Mustafa, No. 04-cr-356 (S.D.N.Y.) (indictment) (on file with author). Mustafa
separately is charged in connection with his personal involvement in a hostage-taking conspiracy in Yemen,
but notably is not charged under § 2339A for that offense. See id.
209 United States v. Abdi, No.04-cr-88 (S.D. Ohio) (indictment) ¶ 3a (on file with author). There is reason
to believe that the government ultimately would have attempted to link Abdi directly to a plot to attack an
Ohio shopping mall. See Kevin Mayhood, Suspect’s Arrest Was Legal, U.S. Argues; Judge Suppressed
Man’s Comments about Terror Attack, COLUM. DISPATCH, July 20, 2006 (referencing bombing suspicions).
210 See United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp.2d 279, 288-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (describing § 2339A charge).
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charges of violating § 2339A through online activities “designed to recruit mujahideen
and raise funds for violent jihad in Israel, Chechnya and other places.”211 Lastly, the
Hassoun prosecution includes a § 2339A charge that is difficult to distinguish from the §
956(a) count in that case. The § 2339A charge against defendants Adham Amin Hassoun
and Mohamed Hesham Yousef rests on their alleged conduct in operating a “support cell”
that “supported and coordinated with other support networks and mujahideen groups
waging violent jihad,” including by engaging in recruiting activity.212 The § 2339A
charge Jose Padilla in turn appears to rest on a self-provision-of-personnel theory, as it is
specifically alleged that he “was recruited by the North American support cell to
participate in violent jihad, and traveled overseas for that purpose.”213
Not surprisingly, given the relatively indirect nature of these allegations, none of
the § 2339A charges in these six cases are or were predicated on an offense constituting a
completed or attempted act of violence. Rather, the § 2339A predicate for each of these
prosecutions is a conspiracy offense – § 956(a) in each instance.
For the reasons discussed above in Part III, it may be that each of these defendants
could be convicted directly under § 956(a); indeed, several have been charged both with
participating in a § 956(a) conspiracy and with providing material support to that offense.
But the important point here is that liability under § 2339A does not depend on proof that
the defendant also violated § 956(a). On the contrary, § 2339A does not even require that
the predicate violation of § 956(a) ever actually occurred. So long as the defendants
intended the money that they raised (or the equipment that they sent, the persons whom
211 United States v. al-Hussayen, No. 3-cr-48 (D. Idaho) (second superseding indictment) ¶ 1 (on file with
author).
212 United States v. Hassoun, No. 04-cr-60001 (S.D. Fla.) (superseding indictment) ¶ 5 (on file with author).
213 Id. ¶ 11. Padilla is not included as a defendant in Appendix B because he was added as a defendant in
2006, outside the time frame of that data set.
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they recruited, the communications that they facilitated, and so forth) would assist in the
formation of such an agreement, or even if they merely knew that it would, then their
conduct was culpable under § 2339A the moment support was rendered. It is in this
sense that § 2339A provides a ground for prosecution in circumstances that might exceed
the grasp of conspiracy liability.
D. Using § 2339A to Incapacitate the Personally-Dangerous Suspect
The preceding discussion establishes that federal prosecutors interpret § 2339A in a
manner that provides them with a weighty charging option even in attenuated
circumstances that (1) might not otherwise be covered by a conspiracy charge, (2) clearly
would not be covered by an attempt charge, and (3) would not be covered by § 2339B or
§ 1705 in the unaffiliated terrorism context. Accordingly, and bearing in mind that DOJ
currently is seeking to maximize the extent to which it can intervene in advance of a
potential terrorist attack, one would expect to find examples of § 2339A being used not
merely in order to cut off the flow of support to dangerous persons but also as a means to
incapacitate suspects who are themselves thought by the government to be capable of
engaging directly in violent acts.
By and large, the post-9/11 prosecutions under § 2339A have been of the
traditional, cut-off-the-flow-of-resources variety.214 But there have been examples in
which prosecutors have taken advantage of the capacious reach of § 2339A in order to
incapacitate a potentially-dangerous person in preliminary circumstances that otherwise
might be beyond prosecution. The most significant example is United States v. Hayat, a
214 These “traditional”-style material support cases arguably include Ahmad, Arnaout, al-Hussayen, Sattar,
Mustafa, and – with respect to defendants Hassoun and Youssef – Hassoun.
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case that epitomizes the anticipatory prosecution strategy and the tension it generates
between the benefits of prevention and the costs of potential false positives.215
Umer Hayat, a Pakistani immigrant, hoped that his oldest son Hamid might grow
up to become a religious scholar.216 Toward that end, Umer had arranged for Hamid to
spend his teenage years studying the Koran while living with relatives back in Pakistan.
When Hamid returned to the family’s home in Lodi, California more than a decade later,
however, he did not pursue further training at the local mosque. Instead, he got a job at a
cherry-packing plant, and for a time seemed to be pursuing a relatively mundane life.
That would soon change.
In 2002 Hamid became acquainted with Naseem Khan, a Pakistani immigrant
who unbeknownst to Hamid was acting as a confidential informant for the FBI (code-
name: Wildcat). The two became close, with Khan ultimately recording more than forty
hours of their conversations. The tapes leave little doubt that Hamid held unpleasant,
controversial views. At one point, for example, Hamid asked Khan if he had heard of the
killing in Pakistan of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, saying “I’m so pleased
about that. They cut him into pieces and sent him back. That was a good job they did.
Now they can’t send one Jewish person to Pakistan.” Hamid also kept a scrapbook filled
with articles clipped from Pakistani newspapers, articles that sharply criticized the U.S.
215 The Seas of David arrests in Miami during the summer of 2006 also include an anticipatory charge
under § 2339A, but because their fact pattern is akin to the “close-nexus scenario” – they are, in fact, also
charged directly with conspiring to commit certain explosives offenses – that case is not on point for the
current discussion. See Batiste, Indictment, supra note 139.
216 The following account is derived from a combination of sources including United States v. Hayat, 05-cr-
240 (E.D. Cal.) (First Superseding Indictment) (on file with author); Mark Arax, The Agent Who Might
Have Saved Hamid Hayat, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at 16 (magazine); Carolyn Marshall, Government
Will Retry Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2006, at A11; Rone Tempest, In Lodi Terror Case, Intent Was
the Clincher, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at B1; Rone Tempest & Eric Bailey, Conviction for Son, Mistrial
for Father in Lodi Terror Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006, at A1; Michele Norris, Lacking a Tie to
Jihadist Camp, Prosecution Rests, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Apr. 5, 2006; Rone
Tempest, Prosecutors Rest Case in Terrorism Trial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at B1.
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government and its role in the world, and he owned books about jihad written by
Massood Azhar (the leader of Jaish-e-Mohmmed, a Pakistani group included on the State
Department’s list of designated foreign terrorist organizations).
Whether Hamid was prepared to take up arms in the name of the global jihad
movement was less clear, however. At one point Khan suggested that he was “going to
fight jihad,” but Hamid replied that “these days there’s no use in doing that. Listen, these
days we can’t go into Afghanistan . . . The American CIA is there.” When Khan later
pressed him about the possibility of attending a jihadist training camp in Pakistan, Hamid
equivocated: “I’m ready, I swear. My father tells me, ‘Man, what a better task than this.’
But when does my mother permit it? Where is a mother’s heart?”
Eventually, Hamid did return to Pakistan, leaving California in the summer of
2003 for a two-year stay. Precisely what he did while there, however, became the subject
of considerable dispute. At the very least, he was there for an arranged marriage and,
when that fell through, to make alternative arrangements. But according to the
government, Hamid also took the occasion of his stay in Pakistan to enroll in a camp
where he received “training in physical fitness, firearms, and means to wage jihad.”217
Was Hamid a terrorist who intended to carry out attacks upon returning to the
U.S., or merely a misguided young man seeking adventure abroad without any intent to
cause harm to others in the future? At this early stage, it was difficult to say with any
certainty. Nonetheless, the FBI took Hamid into custody shortly after his return to the
U.S. A fifteen-hour interrogation ensued as investigators sought a confession that he had
attended a training camp and that he had returned to the U.S. with the goal of carrying out
an attack. Ultimately, Hamid did confess to attending a training camp (an admission
217 Hayat Indictment, supra note 215, at ¶ 7.
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corroborated by his father in a separate interrogation), although he muddled the issue by
giving a series of inconsistent accounts regarding its location and sponsorship. But
initially he denied that he had any intent to carry out an attack in the U.S. He was not
“ready for jihad,” he claimed, adding that this simply “was not on [his] mind.” Ss the
interrogation wore on, however, he eventually changes his story and agreed to the
interrogator’s suggestion that he might be awaiting orders from an imam at the Lodi
mosque. When pressed for details of his plans, the following exchange occurred:
FBI: So jihad means that you fight and you assault something?
Hamid: Uh-huh.
FBI: Give me an example of a target. A building?
Hamid: I’ll say no buildings. I’ll say people.
FBI: OK, people. Yeah. Fair enough. People in buildings . . . I’m
trying to get details about plans over here.
Hamid: They didn’t give us no plans.
FBI: Did they give you money?
Hamid: No money.
FBI: Guns?
Hamid: No.
FBI: Targets in the U.S.?
Hamid: You mean like buildings?
FBI: Yeah, buildings. Sacramento or San Francisco?
Hamid: I’ll say Los Angeles and San Francisco.
FBI: Financial, commercial?
Hamid: I’ll say finance and things like that.
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FBI: Hospitals?
Hamid: Maybe, I’m sure. Stores.
FBI: What kind of stores?
Hamid: Food stores.218
At this point, the evidence of his actions and intentions plausibly could have been
construed in very different ways. To be sure, prosecutors had good reason to believe that
Hayat was a potentially-dangerous person in light of the likelihood that he had received
some kind of military-style training in Pakistan, and in light of his stated sympathy with
the global jihad movement’s anti-American perspective. But the evidence arguably also
was consistent with the view that Hayat was not likely actually to act on his views. And
thus the government faced a familiar dilemma. Should DOJ go ahead and prosecute
Hayat in order to eliminate the chance that he might attempt a violent act and that he
might succeed in that act before the FBI could intervene? Or should the government
instead remain in a surveillance and intelligence-gathering mode, in order both to identify
other potentially-dangerous persons with whom Hayat might have contact and to develop
more reliable indicators (and evidence) of his intentions?219
Ultimately, the government chose to prosecute rather than wait, reflecting the
preference described above for prosecuting at the earliest plausible moment in the
terrorism context. And, in the end, Hayat was convicted by a jury. But on what charge?
He had not committed or attempted an act of violence, of course, and so could not
be charged directly with such an offense. It does not appear that his journey had placed
218 Arax, supra note 215.
219 In this respect, the Hayat fact-pattern closely resembles that involving the Lackawanna defendants
discussed above. See Chesney, Sleeper Scenario, supra note 7, at 39-44.
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him in contact with a designated FTO such as al Qaeda, moreover, meaning that FTO-
oriented charges would not be available. Instead, the case seemed to turn on the
proposition that Hayat had become part of the global jihad movement, or at least some
manifestation of it that had not at the time been specifically designated for purposes of §
2339B or § 1705 liability.
What about a conspiracy charge? Investigators did plainly believe that Hayat was
not merely a lone wolf, but was collaborating with others as part of a network of some
description. And as noted above in connection with Hassoun, prosecutors have on
occasion taken a very broad view of conspiratorial liability in the context of the global
jihad movement. This raised the possibility in Hayat’s case of a conspiracy charge
premised on the prospect of a future act of violence within the United States (in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2332b, for example). Ultimately, however, there was no conspiracy
charge. We do not know, of course, whether such a charge was rejected by the grand jury
or was simply not presented in the first instance. In any event, given the murky evidence
of Hayat’s activities and intentions, it perhaps is not surprising that no conspiracy charge
made it into the indictment.
Hamid Hayat was instead prosecuted under § 2339A, with a pair of additional
counts relating to false statements made to investigators. In particular, the indictment
alleged that Hayat “provided material support or resources . . . knowing and intending
that the material support and resources were to be used in preparation for, and in carrying
out, a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332b (Acts of Terrorism
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Transcending National Boundaries).”220 How had he done so? By providing himself as
“personnel” in furtherance of his own anticipated violation of § 2332b.221
Simply put, the § 2339A charge against Hayat functioned as a sweeping form of
individual inchoate crime liability. This is not to say that Hayat was prosecuted purely
for his illicit intentions, though the prosecutor’s closing argument did emphasize that
“Hamid Hayat had a jihadi heart and a jihadi mind.”222 Hayat had, after all, engaged in
the conduct of obtaining military-type training. But it is to say that § 2339A when
employed in this manner provides a potent alternative to pursuing an attempt charge,
sparing prosecutors the need to await the point at which a lone wolf suspect has reached
the “substantial step” threshold required for attempt liability.
Bearing this in mind, many questions remain as to the significance of the Hayat
prosecution. Is it a laudable example of a criminal prosecution that nipped a terrorist plot
in the bud? Is it a lamentable example of the capacity for early prosecutorial intervention
to result in heavy punishments in cases where the defendant may never have committed
the contemplated harm? We probably will never know for sure; we can only be certain
that the case illustrates both the utility of § 2339A as a foundation for such early-stage
prosecutions and the risks that such an approach entails.
220 United States v. Hayat, No. 05-cr-240 (E.D. Cal.) (First Superseding Indictment), ¶ 3 (on file with
author). Hayat also was charged with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) by making false
statements to federal agents when he denied attending the camp or having any involvement with terrorism.
See id. Counts 2 and 3.
221 First Superseding Indictment, ¶ 3. Notably, the § 2339A charge in United States v. Batiste, the Seas of
David prosecution, relies on the same theory. See Batiste, Indictment, supra note 139, at 9.
222 Tempest (May 1, 2006), supra note 216, (quoting from the government’s closing argument in United
States v. Hamid Hayat).
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V. Conclusion
It is sometimes said of American law that it does not (or at least should not)
criminalize thoughts standing alone.223 The conclusions reached in this article about the
broad scope of liability under terrorism-related conspiracy and support laws are not
inconsistent with that claim. But they do show with some clarity just how far criminal
liability extends along the continuum between thought and deed in the terrorism context.
In some circumstances, the option to prosecute is simply independent of that
continuum. This is true, for example, where the suspect is liable (coincidentally or not)
for some collateral or unrelated offense providing an immediate charging option. And it
is also true where the suspect has purposefully assisted an FTO or other designated entity,
under § 2339B and § 1705. Occasions will arise, however, when pretextual charges are
not available (at least not on a scale that would satisfy the desire for incapacitation), and
the suspect cannot clearly be linked to a designated group. Indeed, such scenarios are
likely to arise with greater frequency in the years to come so long as the global jihad
movement continues along its current decentralizing path.
The scope of the government’s anticipatory prosecution power in the “unaffiliated
terrorism” scenario therefore presents both difficult and pressing issues. Just how early
can prosecutors intervene in that context? Conspiracy liability provides the traditional
solution to this problem, and the pattern of post-9/11 cases does suggest that prosecutors
are maximizing the preventive capacity of statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 956(a). They
need not wait for an agreement to evolve to the point of specifying the details of
223 See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 713-14 (1998) (observing the privilege against self-
incrimination helps to “discourag[e] prosecution for crimes of thought,” and that “the First Amendment
protects against the prosecution of thought crime”); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 713-14 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(discussing our “constitutional heritage” of hostility to criminal liability based solely on a mental state).
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executing an offense, so long as the participants have a shared understanding and intent
regarding the type of offense to be committed. Nor must they cast their net narrowly so
as to treat as co-conspirators only those persons who are in direct contact with one
another. But at the same time, the scope of conspiracy liability must have limits.
Conspiracy prosecutions premised on involvement in the global jihad movement pose a
particular risk in this regard, in light of the temptation to portray the movement
artificially in monolithic, organizational terms and thus to spread a vast, attenuated net of
conspiracy liability.
Conspiracy liability is not, however, the only arrow in the quiver for prosecutors
seeking to intervene at an early stage in the unaffiliated terrorism scenario. The “other”
so-called material support law, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, has quietly emerged as perhaps the
single most important charge in post-9/11 terrorism prosecutions. Several features of the
statute combine to make it applicable in a broad array of circumstances, including
scenarios that might lie just beyond the grasp of conspiracy liability and that lie clearly
beyond the grasp of attempt liability. This makes § 2339A a very attractive and useful
charge from the point of view of prevention, but by shifting the point of potential
prosecutorial intervention further back along the continuum between thought and deed,
the statute entails a variety of off-setting costs. The troubling case of Hamid Hayat
illustrates several of these, including the enhanced possibility of a false positive where
liability turns largely (though by no means entirely) on proof of the defendant’s
intentions, and the lost opportunities to gather additional intelligence and evidence once
overt intervention occurs.
* * *
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Notwithstanding the emphasis in this article on criminal prosecutions as a vehicle
for terrorism prevention, it should not be forgotten that terrorism prevention depends
above all on the effective gathering, sharing, and analysis of intelligence. Criminal
prosecution is only one of several potential modes of response that may be brought to
bear after intelligence has coalesced to the point of establishing serious concern regarding
the threat posed by a particular individual.
That said, it is clear that criminal prosecution has remained a critical mode of
response since the 9/11 attacks, and is likely to become still more prominent in light of
the ongoing legal and political difficulties associated with military detention and the
prospect that terrorism suspects in the future frequently will be U.S. citizens not subject
to immigration enforcement alternatives. Incidents such as the arrest of alleged terrorist
cell members in Toronto, Miami, London, and elsewhere during the summer of 2006,
moreover, emphasize the ongoing process of decentralization in the global jihad
movement, the continuing potency of the terrorist threat, and the political pressure on
prosecutors to offer senior policymakers a criminal law option for incapacitating suspects
at the earliest possible opportunity.224
Selecting that option at times will be precisely the right thing to do, but at other
times it will be unwise both in terms of our security and in terms of the rights of the
individual defendant involved. This is, of course, but the latest round in a long-running
debate regarding the proper bounds of early prosecutorial intervention in the inchoate
crime context. Had the government been obliged to go to Congress after 9/11 to seek
new substantive criminal laws broadly expanding its capacity for preventive prosecution,
224 The disruption of an alleged airline-bombing plot in London in August 2006 no doubt will add to these
pressures. See Partlow, supra note 14.
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we would of course have engaged in a debate regarding these issues long ago. Thanks
largely to the latent capacities of existing statutes such as §§ 2339A and 2339A, though,
for the most part it proved unnecessary to seek such new authorities. Nonetheless, recent
events have at last begun to draw attention to this exceedingly important issue.
For the debate to proceed intelligently, we must first come to a common
appreciation of just how early it is that current federal criminal law permits prosecutors to
intervene. I hope that in this Article I have made a substantial contribution to that
common understanding.
85
Appendix A
Predicate Offenses Under § 2339A
Statute Nature of Offense “Terrorism”-link
required?225
Conspiracy
included?226
18 U.S.C. § 32  attacks on aircraft and air navigation facilities no yes
18 U.S.C. § 37  attacks on international airports and persons
therein
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 81  arson within special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 175  development/possession of biological toxins as
weapons, or without justification
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 175b227  possession or transfer of listed bio-agents no no
18 U.S.C. § 175c228  development or possession of variola virus no yes
18 U.S.C. § 229  development/possession of chemical weapons no yes
18 U.S.C. § 351  killing, kidnapping, or assaulting members of
Congress, cabinet officials, top CIA officials,
Presidential candidates, or Justices
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 831  possession of nuclear materials no yes
18 U.S.C. § 832229  possession of radiological weapon
 providing material support to WMD programs
of a designated FTO or a state sponsor of
terrorism
no; yes yes; yes
18 U.S.C. § 842(m, n)  possession/shipment of plastic explosives
lacking tagant
no no
18 U.S.C. § 844(f, i)  attacking property of U.S. or federally-funded
institutions with explosives or fire
 attacking property involved in interstate/foreign
commerce with explosives or fire
no; no yes; yes
18 U.S.C. § 930(c)  killing in connection with attack on federal no yes
225 Most violent crime statutes that might happen to be applicable in the terrorism context do not require the government to prove, as an element of the offense,
that the defendant’s conduct was intended to influence the government or otherwise was politically motivated.
226 This column indicates whether the predicate offense itself provides for conspiracy liability. Because § 2339A does not include the general conspiracy statute,
18 U.S.C. § 371, as a predicate offense, one can violate § 2339A in connection with a conspiracy offense only with respect to some of these predicate crimes.
227 Section 2339A(a) expressly identifies 33 individual statutes, and then also incorporates by reference the statutes separately identified in 18 U.S.C. §
2332b(g)(5)(B). That list largely overlaps with the provisions expressly identified in § 2339A, but does add a few additional provisions such as this one.
228 See id.
229 See id.
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facility using dangerous weapons
18 U.S.C. § 956  conspiracy to kill, kidnap, or maim outside the
United States
 conspiracy to attack specific property overseas
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)  possession or transfer of classified information
obtained unlawfully from a computer
no no
18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(5)(A)(i)
 using virus, etc. to cause harm to computers of
financial institutions or United States government
no no
18 U.S.C. § 1114  killing U.S. employee in course of duty, or
person who assisted such employee
no no230
18 U.S.C. § 1116  killing internationally protected persons no no
18 U.S.C. § 1203  kidnapping to compel act by government or
third persons
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 1361  injury to government property no no
18 U.S.C. § 1362  injury to or interference with communications
equipment and infrastructure of U.S. government,
or otherwise associated with civil defense or
national security
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 1363  destruction of property within special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 1366  damage to energy facilities no no
18 U.S.C. § 1751  killing, kidnapping, or assaulting President,
Vice-President, or senior White House staff
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 1992  attacking trains or railroad infrastructure no yes
18 U.S.C. § 1993  attacking mass transport systems no yes
18 U.S.C. § 2155  injuring/contaminating national defense
materials or facilities in order to disrupt national
defense
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 2156  disrupting national defense through purposeful
defective construction of defense materials, tools,
or facilities
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 2280  damaging/seizing ship, injuring persons thereon
in manner that threatens navigation, damaging
navigational facilities, or communicating false
information to endanger navigation
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 2281  attacking or endangering fixed maritime
platforms
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 2332  homicide or other physical violence against
U.S. national outside the U.S.
yes231 yes
230 Sections 1114 and 1116 do not provide directly for conspiracy liability, but 18 U.S.C. § 1117 separately provides that conspiracies to violate these statutes are
punishable by up to a life sentence. Since § 2339A does not list § 1117 as a predicate offense, however, it is not clear that § 2339A could be violated by
providing support to a conspiracy to violate either §§ 1114 or 1116.
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18 U.S.C. § 2332a  use of WMD (broadly defined) within U.S.
(with jurisdictional requirements), outside U.S.
against U.S. nationals, or anywhere when
defendant is a U.S. national
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 2332b  killings, kidnappings, assaults, and damage to
property posing serious risk of injury within the
U.S. (with jurisdictional requirements)
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 2332f  placing or detonating explosives in public
places, government facilities, or infrastructure
facilities
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 2332g232  creation or possession of guided missiles or
rockets capable of targeting aircraft, and of
related equipment and parts
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 2332h233  creation or possession of radiological device
posing danger to human life
no yes
18 U.S.C. § 2339234  harboring/concealing person with knowledge
they have committed or are about to commit
certain of the above-listed offenses
no no
18 U.S.C. § 2339C235  intentionally funding conduct that would violate
terrorism-related treaties or that will cause injury
for political effect
yes yes
18 U.S.C. § 2340A  torture (outside the United States) no yes
42 U.S.C. § 2122236  manufacture and possession of atomic weapons no no
42 U.S.C. § 2284  attacking nuclear production, fuel, and storage
facilities
no yes
49 U.S.C. § 46502  aircraft piracy no yes
49 U.S.C. § 46504237  interference with flight crews by assault or
intimidation
no yes
49 U.S.C. §
46505(b)(3) and (c)238
 possession of concealed dangerous weapons or
placement of explosives on aircraft
no yes
49 U.S.C. § 46506239  assaults and other crimes in the special aircraft no no
231 Section 2332 requires a certification from senior DOJ officials to the effect that the violent act “was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a
government or civilian population.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d).
232 See supra note 227.
233 See id.
234 See id.
235 See id. The list provided at § 2332b(g)(5)(B) also includes the two material support provisions, but § 2339A understandably excludes them from
incorporation as predicate offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
236 See supra note 227.
237 See id.
238 See id.
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jurisdiction
49 U.S.C. § 60123(b)  attacking interstate pipelines no yes
239 See id.
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Appendix B
Charging and Disposition Data in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A Prosecutions
Initiated Between September 2001 and September 2004
Defendant240 Dck. # District § 2339 Counts Predicate
Offense
Disposition Sentence Other Terrorism
Conspiracy Charges
Baber Ahmad 04-cr-240 D. Conn. Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (currency,
financial services,
communications
equipment, personnel,
lodging, training, safe
houses, false documents,
facilities, transportation,
other physical assets,
expert advice/assistance)
1. § 956(a)
2. § 2332(b)
extradition pending n/a § 956 – pending
“ “ “ § 2339A (same as above) “ “ “
Azzam Publications “ “ Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (same as above)
“ pending “ § 956 – pending
“ “ “ § 2339A (same as above) “ “ “
Adham Amin Hassoun241 04-cr-60001 S.D. Fla. Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (currency,
recruiting)
§ 956(a) pending “ *242
“ “ “ § 2339A (same as above) “ “ “
Mohamed Hesham Youssef “ “ Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (currency,
recruiting)
“ “ “ *
243
“ “ “ § 2339A (same as above) “ “ “
Yassin Muhiddin Aref 04-cr-402 N.D.N.Y. Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A
(money laundering)
§ 2332a pending n/a n/a
“ “ “ § 2339A “ “
240 Defendants are identified on an individual basis; common docket numbers, of course, indicate co-defendants. In some instances, the lead defendant in an
action does not appear in the table because that individual was not charged under § 2339B.
241 The date restriction for this data requires exclusion of the three additional defendants (including Jose Padilla) who were joined to this prosecution in a
subsequent superseding indictment.
242 Subsequent iterations of the indictment have added a charge under § 956(a) itself, as discussed supra.
243 See id.
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(concealment of support)
“ “ “ “ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ “
Mohammed Mosharref Hossain “ “ Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A
(money laundering)
§ 2332a “ “ “
“ “ “ § 2339A
(concealment of support)
“ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ “ “
Sami Omar al-Hussayen 03-cr-48 D. Idaho Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A
(currency, financial
services, communications
equipment, personnel)
§ 956 acquitted by jury “ “
“ “ “ § 2339A
(currency, monetary
instruments, financial
services, expert advice or
assistance,
communications
equipment)
§ 956 “ “ “
Enaam M. Arnaout 02-cr-892 E.D. Ill. Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A
(equipment)
§ 956(a) dismissed by plea
agreement
“ RICO – dismissed by plea agreement
Hemant Lakhani 03-cr-880 D.N.J. Attempt to violate
§ 2339A (weapons)
1. § 32
2. § 2332a
3. § 2332b
convicted by jury 180 months n/a
Lynne Stewart 02-cr-395 S.D.N.Y. Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (personnel)
§ 956 convicted by jury pending “244
“ “ “ § 2339A (personnel) “ convicted by jury “ “
Mohammed Yousry “ “ Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (personnel)
“ convicted by jury “ “
244 A separate defendant, Ahmed Abdel Sattar, was charged in the same superseding indictment with direct participation in the § 956 conspiracy that was the
predicate for the § 2339A charges against Stewart and Yousry. Stewart and Yousry, however, were not charged with direct participation in that conspiracy.
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“ “ “ § 2339A (personnel) “ convicted by jury “ “
Samir Ait Mohamed 01-cr-1155 “ Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (personnel)
§ 2332b charges dropped245 n/a § 2332b
Nuradin Abdi 04-cr-88 S.D. Ohio Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (personnel)
§ 956246 pending “ n/a
Gale Nettles 04-cr-699 E.D. Ill. Attempt to violate
§ 2339A (explosives)
1. § 844(f)
2. § 844(i)
3. § 1114
acquitted by jury247 “ “
Mohammed Junaid Babar 04-cr-528 S.D.N.Y. Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (equipment)
§ 956(a)248 convicted by
plea agreement
pending “
“ “ “ § 2339A (equipment) “ “ “ “
Randall Todd Royer 03-cr-296 E.D. Va. Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (personnel)
§ 956(a) dismissed by
plea agreement
n/a § 2384 – dismissed by plea
agreement
§ 960 – dismissed by plea agreement
Ibrahim Ahmed al-Hamdi “ “ “ “ “ “ § 960 – dismissed by plea agreement
Masoud Ahmad Khan “ “ “ (personnel, equipment) “ convicted by
bench trial
180 months § 2384 –convicted by bench trial
§ 960 – convicted by bench trial
§ 924(b) – convicted by bench trial
Seifullah Chapman “ “ “ “ “ “ § 960 – convicted by bench trial
§ 924(b) – convicted by bench trial
Hammad Abdur-Raheem “ “ “ (personnel) “ “ 97 months “
Karim Koubriti 01-cr-80778 E.D.Mich. Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (personnel,
documents)
1. § 956
2. § 2332b249
convicted by jury;
vac’d and dism’d250
n/a n/a
245 The United States had requested the extradition of Mohamed from Canada. Charges were dropped after the key witness against Mohamed – Ahmed Ressam,
convicted for plotting to bomb LAX at the millennium – ceased cooperating with authorities. Mohamed subsequently was deported from Canada to an unknown
country.
246 The indictment in Abdi is unclear with respect to whether the predicate offense was meant to be § 956(a), (b), or both. Interestingly, though the indictment
predicates § 2339A liability on violent activity directed overseas (under § 956), documents filed by the government in connection with a detention motion in his
case alleges his involvement with convicted al Qaeda member Iyman Faris in a plot to bomb a shopping mall in Columbus, Ohio. See Department of Justice
Press Release (June 14, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/June/04_crm_399.htm.
247 Nettles was convicted on all other counts, including multiple § 844 counts.
248 Details of the Babar case are difficult to obtain, as the charging information and subsequent proceedings remain sealed. The docket entry for the case
indicates, however, that two charges in the nature of § 2339A were filed, and media reports have described a plea agreement in which Babar pled guilty to the
charges against him. Babar has not . Cf. New York Man Admits He Aided al Qaeda, Set up Jihad Camp, CNN.COM (Aug. 11, 2004), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/11/ny.terror.suspect/. See also Justice Department: Examples of Terrorism Convictions Sept. 11, 2001, available at
http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=68129.
249 The indictment at ¶ 8 mistakenly cites § 2332a, but from the context it is clear that the second predicate offense is intended to be § 2332b.
250 As discussed in the text, supra, the government moved to vacate the convictions in Koubriti in light of post-trial revelations of alleged misconduct by
prosecutors and investigators.
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Abdella Lnu (a.k.a. Abdel-Ilah
Elmardoudi)
“ “ “ “ “ “ “
Farouk ali-Haimoud “ “ “ “ acquitted by jury “ “
Ahmed Hannan “ “ “ “ “ “ “
Mustafa Kamel Mustafa251 04-cr-356 S.D.N.Y. Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (training,
personnel)
§ 956(a) pending n/a § 1203
“ “ “ § 2339A (training,
personnel)
“ “ “
“ “ “ Conspiracy to violate
§ 2339A (money)
“ “ “
“ “ “ § 2339A (money) “ “ “
251 A superseding indictment filed in 2006 adds Aswat Haroon Rashid and Oussama Kassir as defendants on material support and other charges, but these counts
have not been included in the data set because of the date restrictions.
